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Reciprocal Concealed Carry:
The Constitutional Issues 
by WILLIAM D. ARAIZA*
Introduction 
With the Supreme Court’s continued unwillingness to decide Second 
Amendment cases after its foundational decisions finding an individual gun 
possession right1 and applying that right to the states,2  Congress has become 
the focal point for national gun rights.3  One particularly noteworthy federal 
legislative initiative would require states that allow any form of concealed 
weapons carry to honor the concealed carry permits of any other state.  In 
December, 2017, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 38, The 
Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017.4  That bill would amend the 
        * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Thanks to the Center on Gun Violence and 
Hastings Law School for hosting the conference for which this Article was prepared, and to 
participants at that conference, in particular Joseph Blocher, Darrell A.H. Miller, and Eric Ruben.  
Thanks also to Bianca D’Agostaro, Marco Donatelli, Aubria Ralph, and Andrey Udalov for fine 
research assistance. 
 1.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (finding that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to possess guns).  
 2.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 541 U.S. 742 (2010) (applying the Second Amendment 
right to the states, with four justices basing that application on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and one basing it on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause).
As this Article goes to press, the Court has granted cert. on a Second Amendment case involving a 
New York City ordinance that limits the circumstances under which a gun owner may transport her 
gun. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 
No. 18-280, (Jan. 22, 2019). 
 3.  See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Samuel Alito: Populist, 103 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 101 
(2017), for a discussion on the Court’s failure to grant review in significant Second Amendment 
cases after McDonald.
 4.  Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017, H.R. 38, 115th Cong. (2017).  This article will 
focus on the provisions of this bill.  However, one can expect other versions of the bill to be 
introduced as legislators continue to work for enactment of concealed carry reciprocity.  For 
example, the concept of concealed carry reciprocity was explicitly endorsed in the 2016 Republican 
Party Platform.  See https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-
ben_146 8872234.pdf, at 12.  For convenience’s sake, this Article uses H.R. 38 as the subject of its 
analysis, even though future legislation may differ from that bill. 
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federal criminal code to allow individuals to carry a concealed handgun into 
or possess a concealed handgun in another state that allows individuals to 
carry concealed firearms.5  Thus, a state could still prohibit any person (a 
citizen of that state or a visitor from another) from carrying a concealed 
weapon; in such a case the bill would have no effect.  However, if a state had 
any provision at all for concealed carry, the bill would require it to honor a 
concealed carry permit issued by any state, even if the issuing state had more 
relaxed requirements for holding such a permit.6  The bill also prohibits any 
person thus possessing a concealed weapon from being “arrested or 
otherwise detained” without “probable cause” to believe he is not complying 
with the bill’s provisions.7  It also provides that “[p]resentation of facially 
valid documents as specified in subsection (a) [of the bill] is prima facie 
evidence that the individual has [the requisite state-issued] license or 
permit.”8
The push for reciprocal concealed carry has generated a great deal of 
publicity, much of it negative.  Opponents have portrayed it as allowing the 
carrying of concealed weapons in Times Square on New Year’s Eve.9  While 
such criticism is inaccurate to the extent New York prohibits concealed carry 
of any sort, opponents have a point to the extent a state prefers to allow 
concealed carry but only under very limited circumstances.  Moreover, when 
thinking about the extent to which a state might be willing to allow even 
limited concealed carry, it bears remembering that it’s at least plausible—
and quite possibly the better reading of current law—that a state must allow 
either concealed or open carry in some or most public spaces.10  Thus, a state 
that might (understandably) wish to prohibit open carry11 could find itself 
constitutionally obligated to allow some degree of concealed carry—which 
in turn would trigger the obligations of the reciprocal concealed carry bill, 
should it become law.  As noted above, that bill would mandate that state to 
 5.  For a brief description of H.R. 38, see infra Part I.  For a more complete description, see
Hannah Shearer, Jeopardizing ‘Their Communities, Their Safety, and Their Lives’: Forced 
Concealed Carry Reciprocity’s Threat to Federalism, 45 HASTINGS CON. L.Q.  429, 439 (2018). 
 6.  See H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101 (a) (2017). 
 7.  See id. § 101 (c)(1). 
 8.  Id.  For a more detailed explanation of H.R. 38, see infra. Part I. 
 9.  See, e.g., DA Vance On Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act, CBSLOCAL.COM (Dec. 9, 
2017) https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2017/12/09/da-vance-on-concealed-carry-reciprocity-act-its-
ridiculous/ (quoting the Manhattan District Attorney to that effect). 
 10.  See infra note 66 (citing case suggesting that the Second Amendment requires some legal 
method of public carry).  
 11.  See, e.g., Heather Digby Parton, ‘Look at my gun!’ Why NRA’s scary ‘open carry’ craze 
is not about freedom, SALON (May 7, 2014), https://www.salon.com/2014/05/07/look_at_my_ gun 
_why_nras_scary_open_carry_craze_is_not_about_freedom/ (recounting stories of citizen fright 
when confronted with a person openly displaying a weapon). 
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honor all other states’ concealed carry permits, regardless of whether those 
issuing states imposed more lax requirements for obtaining them. 
Clearly, then, federal concealed carry reciprocity (“CCR”) legislation 
has important implications for gun rights, gun control, and the balance 
between state and federal authority to regulate gun possession.  Going 
beyond such policy practicalities, CCR legislation also implicates a complex 
web of constitutional law doctrine spanning not just the scope of the Second 
Amendment right but also federalism and the separation of powers. 
This Article focuses on both the sources of congressional authority to 
enact CCR legislation and what it calls the “constitutional defenses” to CCR 
legislation.  Such legislation would have to be grounded either in Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce,12 its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment,13 which has been held to incorporate the Second Amendment’s 
individual right to possess a weapon,14 or its power granted by Article IV’s 
full faith and credit provision.15  Each of these three sources of congressional 
power provides at least an argument in favor of Congress’s power to enact 
CCR legislation; however, each of them raises serious constitutional 
questions.  After Part I of this Article introduces the version of CCR 
legislation it will analyze, Part II considers whether one or more of these 
sources of congressional power authorizes enactment of CCR legislation;16
however, with the exception of its discussion of the enforcement power, it 
does not purport to reach a conclusive answer to the congressional power 
question. 
Instead, this Article assumes that at least one of these sources authorizes 
enactment of CCR legislation.  It then focuses on whether such a law would 
nevertheless violate one of two affirmative limits on congressional 
legislation: first, the requirement that federal legislation not “commandeer” 
state governments, and second, the requirement that Congress not delegate 
away its legislative power.17  Part III concludes that there are plausible 
 12.  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
 13.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 14.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 541 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporating the Second 
Amendment, with a four-justice plurality basing that decision on the Due Process Clause and 
Justice Thomas reaching the same result based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
 15.  U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1. 
 16.  See infra. Part II (A) (considering the Commerce Clause basis for CCR legislation); infra.
Part II (B) (considering the Enforcement Clause basis); infra. Part II (C) (considering the full faith 
and credit basis). 
 17.  As discussed throughout this Article, it is unclear whether the anti-commandeering 
prohibition applies to all of these sources of federal power.  See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (considering that prohibition’s applicability to the enforcement power); 
see text accompanying infra note 152 (considering its applicability to Congress’s power under 
Article IV’s full faith and credit guarantee). 
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arguments that CCR legislation, or parts of it, would violate one or both of 
these affirmative limitations on congressional power. 
I.  H.R. 38 
Title I of H.R. 38—the Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 201718—
generally requires any state that allows the concealed carriage of a weapon 
to honor a concealed carry permit issued by any other state.19  H.R. 38 
contains no requirement that an issuing state’s license, in order to be valid in 
a host state, be granted only on the satisfaction of certain criteria, except that 
the holder of such a license not be prohibited by federal law from carrying a 
concealed weapon.20  Thus, for example, under H.R. 38 a person may obtain 
a concealed carry license from a state that does not impose any requirements 
for obtaining such a license, and insist on the validity of that license in a state 
that imposes stringent criteria for obtaining such a license.  Indeed, if the 
issuing state issues permits to non-residents, a citizen of the host state may 
travel to the issuing state, obtain a license, and travel back to her home state 
and insist on the license’s validity, even if that home state would have denied 
her a license under its own criteria.  Perhaps importantly, however, any 
holder of an out-of-state-issued concealed carry permit may use that permit 
to carry only a gun “that has been shipped or transported in interstate 
commerce.”21  As noted below,22 H.R. 38’s drafters may have inserted this 
limitation to bring it within the federal power to regulate interstate 
commerce. 
 18.  See supra, text accompanying note 4.  
 19.   Notwithstanding any provision of the law of any State or political subdivision 
thereof (except as provided in subsection (b)) and subject only to the 
requirements of this section, a person who is not prohibited by Federal law from 
possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm, who is carrying a valid 
identification document containing a photograph of the person, and who is 
carrying a valid license or permit which is issued pursuant to the law of a State 
and which permits the person to carry a concealed firearm or is entitled to carry 
a concealed firearm in the State in which the person resides, may possess or 
carry a concealed handgun (other than a machinegun or destructive device) that 
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.   
H.R. 38, § 101 (a) (a). 
Subsection (b), referred to above, allows states to authorize a private person to “prohibit guns on 
that person’s property, and also allows states to prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on 
any State or local government property, installation, building, base, or park.” Id. § 101 (a) (b). 
 20.  See id.
 21.  Id.
 22.  See infra Part II (A). 
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The bill also regulates how local law enforcement may respond to a 
person who produces an out-of-state-issued concealed carry permit.  Section 
101(a) states: 
(c) (1) A person who carries or possesses a concealed handgun 
in accordance with subsections (a) and (b) may not be arrested or 
otherwise detained for violation of any law or any rule or regulation 
of a State or any political subdivision thereof related to the 
possession, transportation, or carrying of firearms unless there is 
probable cause to believe that the person is doing so in a manner not 
provided for by this section. Presentation of facially valid 
documents as specified in subsection (a) is prima facie evidence that 
the individual has a license or permit as required by this section.z23
 As this Article will explain,24 subsection (c), while perhaps intended to 
allow holders of out-of-state-issued concealed carry permits to fully enjoy 
the right the bill seeks to provide, raises difficult constitutional questions 
about federal power to prescribe how local law enforcement goes about its 
work enforcing concealed carry permit requirements. 
II.  The Power Issues, Briefly Considered 
As noted in the Introduction, three sources of congressional power to 
enact H.R. 38, and CCR more generally, immediately present themselves: 
the Article I power to regulate interstate commerce,25 the power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 of which has been understood to 
incorporate the Second Amendment,26 and the Article IV power to “prescribe 
the Manner” in which “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings” to 
which full faith and credit must be given “shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.”27  Each of these powers presents a facially plausible foundation for 
CCR.  But, as this Part preliminarily sketches out, each presents its own 
complications and ambiguities. 
A.  The Commerce Power 
At first blush, the commerce power presents a highly plausible 
constitutional foundation for a CCR law.  Even after the last quarter-century 
 23.  H.R. 38, § 101(a)(c). 
 24.  See infra. Part III (A). 
 25.  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
 26.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; McDonald, 541 U.S. 742. 
 27.  U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1. 
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of minor cutbacks,28 the commerce power remains broad, and quite capable 
of justifying federal regulation of completely intrastate conduct as long as 
that conduct has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.29  The CCR bill, 
which allows persons possessing an out-of-state concealed carry permit to 
carry a concealed weapon in a jurisdiction that otherwise allows at least some 
concealed carry, would at first blush satisfy the substantial effects 
requirement. 
But the matter is cloudier than that.  Most foundationally, in United 
States v. Lopez,30 the Court applied more stringent review under the 
substantial effects requirement because the activity in question was non-
economic.31 Lopez’s analysis is especially pertinent to CCR legislation, 
since the activity deemed non-economic in Lopez was the possession of a 
gun.  In Lopez, the Court held that Congress could regulate such non-
economic activity under the substantial effects prong of the commerce power 
only if (1) the regulated activity “is an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless 
the intrastate activity were regulated;”32 (2) the statute “contains [a] 
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, 
that the [regulated activity] in question affects interstate commerce;33 or (3) 
Congress provided findings that revealed a link between the regulated 
activity and interstate commerce.34
In a later case the Court sharply restricted the probative value of 
congressional findings.35  Moreover, the CCR bill is not “an essential part of 
a larger regulation of economic activity,” unlike, for example, the Controlled 
Substances Act’s (CSA’s) ban on local possession of controlled substances, 
 28.  See National Federation of Indep. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding 
that the commerce power did not justify enactment of the Affordable Care Act); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the commerce power did not justify the Violence 
Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the commerce 
power did not justify the Gun Free Schools Zones Act). 
 29.  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006) (upholding a federal prosecution for local 
cultivation and possession of marijuana, under the federal Controlled Substances Act).  The 
commerce power also allows Congress to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.  The CCR bill likely does not fall under either of these 
categories, except as a necessary consequence of satisfying the “jurisdictional element” prong of 
the substantial effects requirement, as described in the text. 
 30.  514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 31.  See id. at 559–63. 
 32.  Id. at 561. 
 33.  Id. at 561.  
 34.  See id. at 562. 
 35.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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which the Court observed was an essential part of the CSA’s wide-ranging 
regulation of interstate trafficking in illicit drugs.36
This leaves the so-called “jurisdictional element” or “jurisdictional 
hook” element from Lopez.  Indeed, the CCR bill’s drafters appear to have 
been aware of this mechanism for invoking Congress’s commerce power, 
since they provided for reciprocal concealed carry rights only for guns that 
had traveled in interstate commerce.37  Thus, the strongest Commerce Clause 
argument for congressional authority to enact the CCR bill rests on the force 
of the bill’s jurisdictional element. 
But the jurisdictional element argument is not a sure-fire winner.  First, 
the Court itself has suggested that insertion of a jurisdictional element does 
not necessarily guarantee the constitutionality of a federal statute under the 
Commerce Clause.38  It seems to have understood its own statement as a 
warning that particular applications of a jurisdictional hook may be so 
tenuous as to raise constitutional problems.  For example, the Court itself 
gave a limiting interpretation to a federal arson statute that by its terms 
featured a jurisdictional element via its application only to “any building, 
vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”39  In Jones v. United States,40 the Court rejected application of 
this law to punish the arson of a private home.  It rejected the government’s 
argument that the statute’s jurisdictional hook (the “used in interstate or 
foreign commerce” language) was satisfied because the home was secured 
by a mortgage from an out-of-state lender, was insured by an out-of-state 
insurance firm, and received natural gas from out of state.  It did so in part 
because of the traditional rule of lenity governing criminal law;41 more 
relevantly for our purposes, however, it relied primarily on the constitutional 
avoidance canon, citing the constitutional issue it warned would arise under 
the Commerce Clause were the statute read as broadly as the government 
urged.42  Thus, a jurisdictional hook by itself would not suffice to render any 
given application of federal law constitutional under the Commerce Clause 
 36.  See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 37.  H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101(a) (2017). 
 38.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (a jurisdictional element “may establish that the enactment 
is in pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce”) (emphasis added). 
 39.  18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1986). 
 40.  529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
 41.  See Jones, 529 U.S.at 858. 
 42.  See id. at 857–58. 
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when satisfaction of that hook would threaten the values the Court has found 
in that clause.43
Some lower courts have also limited the significance of a law’s 
jurisdictional hook when performing Commerce Clause analysis.  For 
example, in United States v. Patton,44 the Tenth Circuit held that a federal 
law that prohibited convicted felons from possessing body armor that was 
sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce failed to satisfy any of the 
three Lopez categories for valid Commerce Clause regulation.45  Writing for 
the panel opinion, Judge McConnell wrote that a” jurisdictional hook is 
not . . . a talisman that wards off constitutional challenges.”46  He observed 
that the jurisdictional hook in the body armor law “does not seriously limit 
the reach of the statute.”47  Given that the defendant’s possession of the 
armor was non-economic, intrastate activity, and that the statute was not an 
essential part of a broader federal scheme of regulation of interstate 
commerce, he concluded that his possession did not substantially affect 
interstate commerce.48
To be sure, as Judge McConnell explained, a jurisdictional element 
does influence Clause analysis.  He wrote, “the principal practical 
consequence of a jurisdictional hook is to make a facial constitutional 
challenge unlikely or impossible, and to direct litigation toward the question 
of whether, in the particular case, the regulated conduct possesses the 
requisite connection to interstate commerce.”49  Following this analysis, the 
 43.  See, e.g., id. at 858 (noting the Court’s concern in United States v. Lopez about federal 
regulation of subjects traditionally regulated by states, and expressing concern that a broad reading 
of the federal arson statute would implicate that concern). 
 44.  451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 45.  Nevertheless, the court upheld the felon’s conviction under the body armor statute, 
following pre-Lopez Supreme Court precedent that had assumed its constitutionality, even if several 
lower court decisions after Lopez questioned the viability of that assumption.  See id. at 636 
(upholding congressional power to enact the statute under the authority of the pre-Lopez precedent); 
id. at 635 (acknowledging lower court uncertainty about the continued viability of that precedent). 
 46.  Id. at 632.  
 47.  Id. at 633. 
A purely nominal jurisdictional requirement, that some entity or object involved 
in the crime be drawn from interstate commerce, does nothing to prevent the 
shifting of [the federal/state] balance in favor of the federal government.  As has 
been amply demonstrated, virtually all criminal actions in the United States 
involve the use of some object that has passed through interstate commerce. 
Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal 
Criminal Law, 31 COLUM J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 113 (1998). 
 48.  Again, though, the court upheld the defendant’s conviction on the strength of the Supreme 
Court’s pre-Lopez precedent assuming the statute’s constitutionality.  See supra text accompanying 
note 45. 
 49.  Patton, 451 F.3d at 633. 
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existence of a jurisdictional hook in the reciprocal concealed carry bill would 
likely shift the focus of Commerce Clause analysis to individual instances of 
persons seeking to use an issuing state’s concealed carry permit in a host 
state, using a gun that had moved in interstate commerce at some point. 
When so presented, the question becomes the strength of the interstate 
commerce connection to the particular gun that particular permit holder 
wished to carry.  Suppose, for example, that a holder of a Nevada concealed 
carry permit traveled to California and sought to carry a gun that had moved 
in interstate commerce fifty years earlier.  In Patton, Judge McConnell 
dismissed the limiting effect of the body armor statute’s jurisdictional 
hook—that is, the statute’s requirement that the armor the felon could not 
possess have been “sold or offered for sale, in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”50  In evaluating whether that provision meaningfully limited the 
law’s scope, he used language that could easily translate into the CCR 
context: “Nearly all body armor will meet that test.  More important, there is 
no reason to think that possession of body armor that satisfies the 
jurisdictional hook has any greater effect on interstate commerce than 
possession of any other body armor.”51
As suggested by the example above, much the same could be said of 
H.R. 38’s jurisdictional hook.  Except for guns that were actually 
manufactured in the host state and that never crossed a state boundary, any 
gun that a permit holder might wish to carry in a host state would satisfy the 
bill’s requirement.52  Cases such as Patton suggest that such attenuated 
connections to interstate commerce might not suffice to create the substantial 
effects Lopez requires to justify federal regulation of that particular instance 
of concealed carry. 
These are, admittedly, difficult arguments to embrace by those who 
favor strong federal regulatory power.  Calling for courts to scrutinize 
jurisdictional hooks more carefully, as Judge McConnell did in Patton,53
might call into question a whole range of federal laws, particularly 
environmental laws, that regulate local activities if they are found to have 
 50.  Patton, 451 F.3d at 633 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(35)). 
 51.  Id.
 52.  Cf. St. Laurent, supra note 47 (noting the ubiquity in criminal conduct of materials that 
at some point had crossed state lines). 
 53.  Notably, while Judge McConnell concluded that there was no “rational basis” for 
concluding that possession of the body armor the statute regulated substantially affected interstate 
commerce, he appears to have applied more searching scrutiny than that normally associated with 
rational basis review. Patton, 451 F.3d at 634.  See id. at 633 (“Where Congress has chosen to 
allow production, distribution, and sale of body armor in interstate commerce, however, it is hard 
to understand why possession of armor that [moves in interstate commerce] is more objectionable 
than any other.”). 
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some connection to interstate commerce.54  The challenge this possibility 
poses to advocates of both federal power and reasonable gun regulation 
echoes the analogous challenge pro-choice advocates faced when deciding 
whether to challenge the federal partial-birth abortion ban on Commerce 
Clause grounds.55  Indeed, that concern might increase when one encounters 
not just Judge McConnell’s (and others’) concern about any jurisdictional 
hook’s broad sweep, but also, in turn, the policy skepticism that breadth 
inspired him to express.56  Given that standing to challenge a CCR law would 
likely be limited to states seeking to resist having to honor out-of-state 
concealed carry permits, the state attorneys general who would have to craft 
the arguments would likely confront the broader political and jurisprudential 
concerns of embracing a broad argument against federal regulatory power.  
Thus, the concern about embracing an argument that might create 
undesirable consequences in other contexts would be a real one, felt by those 
who would be responsible for bringing the legal challenge in the first place. 
B.  The Enforcement Power 
Another seemingly obvious source for Congress’s power to enact CCR 
legislation is its power to enforce the Second Amendment, as incorporated 
to apply against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.57  However, extant 
Second Amendment doctrine, to which a CCR bill must be substantively 
related in order to constitute valid enforcement legislation, raises doubts 
about such a bill’s Enforcement Clause foundation.  Even more glaringly, so 
does the very nature of the right CCR legislation would confer. 
 54.  On the other hand, it might be possible to distinguish away more stringent applications 
of the jurisdictional element prong when considering challenges to environmental statutes, if in 
such challenges the identification of particular instances of the regulated activity is more  
difficult given the interconnected nature of ecosystems, species populations, and airsheds and 
watersheds. See, e.g., GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(“Although . . . there is no express jurisdictional element in [the Endangered Species Act’s [ESA’s] 
prohibition on takings of endangered species], our analysis of the interdependence of species 
compels the conclusion that regulated takes under ESA do affect interstate commerce.”).  Cf.
National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1049 (D.C. Cir.1997), cert denied,
524 U.S. 937 (1998) (“A class of activities can substantially affect interstate commerce regardless 
of whether the activity at issue—in this case the taking of endangered species—is commercial or 
noncommercial.”).  
 55.  See, e.g., Jordan Goldberg, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why 
Progressives Might Be Tempted to Embrace Federalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (2006) (setting 
forth this challenge). 
 56.  Patton, 451 F.3d at 633 (“More important [than the broad sweep of the body armor 
statute’s jurisdictional hook], there is no reason to think that possession of body armor that satisfies 
the jurisdictional hook has any greater effect on interstate commerce than possession of any other 
body armor.”). 
 57.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 541 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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1.  Judicial Doctrine 
The first—and, to date, essentially the only58—place to look for 
Supreme Court doctrine on the scope of the Second Amendment right is its 
2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.59  As readers will know, 
Heller held that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to 
firearm possession, rather than a collective right grounded in militia service.  
The five-justice majority, speaking through Justice Scalia, relied heavily on 
originalist methodology to reach this decision (as did Justice Stevens’ 
dissent, which also used historical materials to reach the opposite 
conclusion).60
In the course of reaching that conclusion, the majority opinion made 
several remarks suggesting that the Second Amendment right does not 
include a right to concealed carry.  When reviewing Nineteenth century 
decisions construing state constitutional analogues to the Second 
Amendment, the Court cited several such decisions that upheld bans on 
concealed carry.61  Indeed, Justice Scalia’s use of the concealed carry issue 
to illustrate his more general point that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured 
by the Second Amendment is not unlimited”62 comes very close to a 
statement that the Second Amendment does not guarantee a right to 
concealed carry,63 even if the Court did not actually say it.64
 58.  The only other Second Amendment cases the Court has decided since deciding that the 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess firearms are McDonald, which simply 
incorporated the Second Amendment right as set forth in Heller to apply against the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S.Ct. 1027 (2016), which rejected a 
state court’s conclusion that a stun gun was not covered by the Second Amendment.  Caetano does 
add something to Supreme Court firearms rights doctrine, and is discussed later.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 80-82.  But See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted, N.Y. State Rifle & 
Pistol Ass’n v. City of N.Y., No. 18-280, (Jan. 22, 2019). 
 59.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 60.  See generally Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009) (discussing this aspect of the opinions in Heller). 
 61.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 613 (discussing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840)); id. at 626 
(citing State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 3858 (La. 1858) and Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846)); id.
(concluding that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that 
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state 
analogues”).
 62.  Id. at 626. 
 63.  See, e.g., Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry For All: Heller and Our Nineteenth Century 
Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J.1486, 1995 (describing this statement as “about as close as 
dictum can get”). 
 64.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (by contrast, the Court did say that restrictions on certain 
types of persons possessing firearms, possession of firearms in certain locations, and restrictions 
on firearms sales, were constitutional).   
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Several lower courts have read Heller and the history upon which it 
relied to warrant a conclusion that, indeed, the Second Amendment does not 
confer a right to concealed carry.65  However, this reading creates a problem 
when one considers the relationship between concealed carry and public 
carry.  Assuming, as Heller seems to imply, that there may be some right to 
public carriage of a weapon,66 that carriage must take the form of either open 
carry (that is, the open display of a firearm on one’s person) or concealed 
carry.  Given Heller’s apparent approval of restrictions and even bans on 
concealed carry,67 it follows that if, as Heller also implies, the Second 
Amendment protects some measure of public carry, that carry must be public 
if the jurisdiction chooses to ban concealed carry. 
To be sure, many jurisdictions, if required to choose, would probably 
choose to allow concealed rather than open carry.68  This choice would be 
relevant for the effective reach of a CCR law, since the reciprocal concealed 
carry right would only apply in jurisdictions that allowed some measure of 
concealed carry.  For Second Amendment enforcement purposes, however, 
the more formalistic fact would be the relevant one: the Second Amendment 
does not appear to grant to a right to concealed carry per se. 
2.  Congressional Enforcement Power 
In other writing I have considered the general question of Congress’s 
power to enforce the Second Amendment.69  To briefly summarize a 
complicated question, any such enforcement legislation must satisfy the 
“congruence and proportionality” standard set forth in the now-foundational 
1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores.70 Boerne and the major enforcement 
power cases that came after it71 stated and applied a requirement that 
 65.  E.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citing 
other courts reaching the same conclusion); Petersen v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1211 (10th Cir. 
2013) (same). 
 66.  See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(observing that since Heller spoke of home possession as the “core” Second Amendment right, 
there must necessarily be a “non-core” right to public possession), rev’d, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 
2016) (en banc); id. at 1153 (arguing that Heller’s statement about the presumptive constitutionality 
of firearms possession restrictions in certain sensitive public places implies that public possession 
of guns in non-sensitive places is constitutionally protected at least to some degree). 
 67.  See supra cases cited note 61. 
 68.  See, e.g., supra note 11 (explaining why jurisdictions may make this choice by illustrating 
the public fear that accompanies instances of open carry). 
 69.  See William D. Araiza, Arming the Second Amendment—And Enforcing the Fourteenth,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017) [hereinafter Araiza, Arming]. 
 70.  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 71.  See Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Savings Plan v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 666 
(1999) (striking down a patent rights law’s application to state infringers as exceeding the 
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enforcement legislation reflect some non-trivial relationship to the 
underlying Fourteenth Amendment right the legislation sought to enforce.72
In applying that requirement, which Boerne expressed through its 
“congruence and proportionality” formula, the Court has relied heavily on 
judicial decisions in Fourteenth Amendment cases as creating the focal point 
for congruence and proportionality review.  In addition, the Court has often 
insisted that enforcement legislation closely track the contours of the right 
announced in those decisions.73  In other writing I have criticized this 
approach to congruence and proportionality review.74  In that writing, I argue 
that such review should use as its focal point underlying constitutional 
meaning rather than judicial doctrine, since judicial doctrine may reflect 
enforcement power); Kimel v. Board of Trustees, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the enforcement 
power did not give Congress the power to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to 
state government employers); Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the 
enforcement power did not give Congress the power to apply the employment provisions of the 
Americans With Disabilities Act to state government employers); Nevada Dept. of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding application of the family leave provisions of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act to state government employers under the enforcement power); 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding application of the public services provisions 
of the Americans With Disabilities Act to states as applied to the right to access courthouses); 
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (holding that the enforcement 
power did not give Congress the power to apply the personal leave provisions of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act to state government employers); see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 
151 (2006) (upholding application of the public services provisions of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act under the enforcement power, as applied to claims made by a state prisoner that 
the state’s alleged conduct violating the ADA also violated his rights under the Eighth 
Amendment); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (holding that Congress’s power to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment did not authorize it to re-authorize the preclearance provisions 
of the Voting Rights Act). 
 72.  At least one commenter views Boerne as providing significantly more leeway for 
enforcement legislation, including CCR legislation.  National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 
2011: Hearings Before the United States House of Representatives Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Security, Of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 11–12 (2011) (Testimony of 
David B. Kopel, Adjunct Professor, Denver University Sturm College of the Law) [hereinafter 
Kopel Testimony].  Even assuming this analysis reflects a correct reading of Boerne—something 
that is difficult to evaluate given its brief analysis of a complex case—it neglects to consider post-
Boerne cases that have usually applied congruence and proportionality review significantly more 
stringently. See supra cases cited note 71 and infra sources cited note 73. 
 73.  See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: 
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) (illustrating examples of such 
stringent enforcement power scrutiny); William D. Araiza, New Groups and Old Doctrine: 
Rethinking Congressional Power to Enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 37 FLA. STATE L. REV.
451, 466–68 (2010) [hereinafter Araiza, New Groups]; WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114–117 (NYU PRESS 2016) [hereafter ARAIZA, ENFORCING] (all same). 
 74.  See Araiza, New Groups, supra note 73; ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 73; William
D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TULANE 
L. REV. 519 (2005); William D. Araiza, The Enforcement Power in Crisis, 18 U. PA. J. CON. L.
ONLINE 1 (2015). 
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institutional competence and democratic legitimacy concerns specific to 
courts that have no proper place in evaluating congressional work-product 
enacted under the enforcement power. 
How would congruence and proportionality review, as practiced by the 
Court, play out with regard to CCR legislation?  Would such review, as I 
argue it should be practiced, yield a different result?  The answer to the first 
of these questions—the more practically relevant one—casts doubt on the 
enforcement power bona fides of such a law.  So does the second. 
Analysis of this first question—that is, whether a CCR law would be 
congruent and proportional to the Second Amendment right under the 
Court’s current approach to congruence and proportionality review—is 
immediately plagued by the oddity of the right a CCR law would confer.  
Such a law would, by its terms, simply mandate nationwide reciprocal 
validity of any concealed carry permit issued by any state.75  It would not 
enact any substantive federal concealed carry policy,76 or set any federal 
standards for the kinds of concealed carry permits issued by one state that 
the other 49 states would have to respect.  In a real way, the CCR bill sets no 
substantive federal gun policy at all.77
This lack of a substantive federal gun rights policy, in the context of a 
putative enforcement statute, “confounds”78 conventional congruence and 
proportionality analysis.  The bill’s lack of such a policy makes it impossible 
to perform the comparative measuring task—that is, the measuring of the 
law for “congruence” and “proportionality” to the right the law sought to 
enforce—that is central to Boerne’s approach.79  As such, it simply cannot 
be understood as appropriate legislation under Boerne’s approach. 
This conclusion would hold even if it were shown that states were 
engaging in serious violations of the Second Amendment right as the Court 
understood it.80  For example, Heller at least implies that the Second 
Amendment might provide some protection for self-defense-justified 
 75.  This statement slightly overstates the effect of the CCR bill, as it requires that any such 
permit-carrier not be otherwise prohibited by federal law from possessing a concealed weapon.  See 
H.R. 38, § 101 (a) (a). 
 76.  But see supra note 75. 
 77.  See generally infra Part III (B) (arguing that the CCR bill would violate the non-
delegation doctrine, in part based on this lack of substantive standards). 
 78.  Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (concluding that a provision of the 
Colorado Constitution denying any protected status on the basis of same-sex or bisexual orientation 
“confounds” traditional equal protection review by being simultaneously too broad and too narrow, 
and thus making it impossible for the Court to test it for compliance with the foundational 
requirement that all laws have at least a rational connection to a legitimate government interest). 
 79.  Id. (identifying an analogous problem with a similarly-unusual statute). 
 80.  Cf. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (holding that Massachusetts’ law 
banning most possessions of stun guns violated the Second Amendment). 
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possessions of guns in public, both by describing the home as the place where 
the “core” Second Amendment was “most acute” (thus suggesting other 
locations where the need might exist, even if in a “less acute” form)81 and by 
its endorsement of prohibitions on carrying guns in certain “sensitive 
places,” thus suggesting that other, “less sensitive,” places might be venues 
for constitutionally-protected carriage.82  Yet the CCR bill would provide no 
substantive protection for public concealed carriage of a gun, other that 
whatever protection a given state may choose to provide, which would then 
become close to a de facto national standard via the reciprocity 
requirement.83
To be sure, one can speculate about the likely effects of a CCR law on 
the substantive landscape of concealed carry rights in the United States.  For 
example, one might examine particularly permissive jurisdictions today and 
use their concealed carry rules as the relevant enforcement statute input into 
the congruence and proportionality calculus.  Such speculation, however, is 
just that—speculation.  For example, we could not know whether, in face of 
nationwide reciprocity, such permissive jurisdictions would take steps to 
limit the availability of concealed carry permits to their own citizens.  But 
even were we to know with precision the concealed carry policies states 
eventually adopted in the face of a CCR law, the more important objection 
to that entire line of enforcement power analysis is that that enforcement 
statute itself would not be the source of any such policy. 
This should be enough to rebut the enforcement power argument.  But 
if it were not, it bears realizing that an enforcement power argument for the 
 81.  See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The [Heller]
Court . . . clarif[ied] that the need for the [firearm possession for self-defense] right is “most acute” 
in the home, thus implying that the right exists outside the home, though the need is not always as 
‘acute.’”); id. (concluding that such statements from Heller, though short of dispositive, strongly 
suggest that the Second Amendment secures a right to carry a firearm in some fashion outside the 
home).
 82.  See supra text accompanying note 66 (citing an appellate opinion adopting this 
reasoning).  One might read Caetano as more explicit support for the proposition that gun rights 
extend into the public, given that the individual in that case was arrested for possessing a stun gun 
in public). See Caetano,136 S. Ct. at 1028, 1028 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (recounting 
the facts of the case).  However, because the state court had simply categorically excluded stun 
guns from Second Amendment protection in upholding a state law completely prohibiting their 
possession, the Court did not reach the public possession question).  
 83.  To be sure, a quite permissive concealed carry state may restrict the availability of 
concealed carry permits to its own citizens, thus avoiding becoming the desired venue for obtaining 
such permits nationwide and thus the source for the de facto national standard.  But a state would 
be under no obligation to impose such limits, and under the CCR bill every other state that allowed 
some form of concealed carry would have to honor that issuing state’s permits, even if the holder 
of the permit possesses the gun in her home state and would not have qualified for a permit under 
her home state’s law.  See Shearer, supra note 5, at 433 (noting this point). 
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CCR bill turns the Enforcement Clause on its head.  The enforcement power 
is a federal power designed to empower Congress to ensure that states act in 
conformance with the Fourteenth Amendment.  An enforcement statute that 
delegated to the states themselves the power to determine what the Second 
Amendment demands violates that underlying understanding of what the 
Enforcement Clause, and more generally the Fourteenth Amendment, sought 
to accomplish.84  Indeed, the reciprocity feature that is central to CCR 
legislation renders the headstand even starker, since it effectively allows one 
or a small number of states to determine what the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires and to impose that understanding on the other states.85
This analysis applies regardless of whether the Court applies its 
standard approach to Boerne—one that gives dominant effect to its own 
court-announced doctrine when establishing the constitutional target at 
which enforcement legislation must aim86—or whether it adopts a more 
nuanced approach.87  A more nuanced approach would recognize that court-
announced constitutional doctrine may reflect underenforcement of the 
relevant constitutional provision, due to epistemic anxieties the Court may 
have or simply a respect for states’ democratic political processes.88  This 
recognition in turn might justify a broader congressional role in enacting 
enforcement legislation, given Congress’s equal—and, indeed, broader—
democratic pedigree as compared to state legislatures, and its superior fact-
finding capabilities as compared to federal courts.89
 84. What appellant ignores is that Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, 
has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The power to ‘enforce’ may at times also include the power to define 
situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt 
prophylactic rules to deal with those situations. 
Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Ex 
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) (The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments “were 
intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements of the 
power of Congress.”). 
 85.  See supra note 83 (explaining how a CCR law could lead to that result). 
 86.  See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 73, at 113–23 (explaining the Court’s standard 
approach to congruence and proportionality review). 
 87.  See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 73 at 141–206 (explaining and arguing for a more 
nuanced approach to congruence and proportionality review). 
 88.  See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (classic statement of the idea that judicial 
doctrine may be properly understood as not stating the full extent of constitutional rights). 
 89.  See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 73, at 169–93; William D. Araiza, Deference to 
Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 878 (2013); Caitlin Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights 
Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185 (2013); Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth 
Constitutional Decision-Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2013). 
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But even under this more nuanced approach to the enforcement power, 
CCR legislation would flounder because of the lack of a substantive standard 
in that law.  Simply put, any application of congruence and proportionality 
review requires that the enforcement statute feature a substantive policy, in 
order for it to be subject to coherent testing against the constitutional 
baseline, however court-centric (or not) that baseline is.90  CCR legislation 
simply lacks such a substantive policy.  As such, it cannot be considered 
legitimate enforcement legislation.91
There is much more to say about Congress’s authority to enforce the 
Second Amendment.92  The question is important: the gun rights issue elicits 
strong feelings on both sides of the debate, and the two sides map neatly onto 
the nation’s current sharp geographical/political divide.  This means that 
there exist simultaneously different gun regulation regimes across the 
nation93 and strong impetus toward enacting national legislation, a logical 
foundation for at least some of which would be the enforcement power.  
Thus, it behooves scholars to continue thinking about the enforcement power 
 90.  See supra notes 86-87 (citing sources explaining, respectively, more and less court-
centered approaches to congruence and proportionality review). 
 91.  The argument that CCR legislation could somehow be thought of as enforcing the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to travel requires little discussion.  As stated by one proponent of this 
theory, the theory would be that Congress could decide to protect the right to interstate travel by 
making it safer by allowing out-of-state travelers to possess weapons pursuant to their home states’ 
laws.  See Kopel Testimony, supra note 72, at 5–6.   
Whether the right in question is a right to travel interstate without encountering “unreasonable” 
state-imposed burdens, or, alternatively, a right to sojourn in a state free from any unreasonable 
discrimination based on the visitor’s out-of-state status, see Kopel Testimony, supra note 72 at 5–
6; it is close to impossible to see how giving the visitor a special right—a right to carry a weapon 
pursuant to his home state’s laws, rather than simply the right to carry a weapon pursuant to the 
laws of the state he visits—constitutes an “appropriate,” U.S. CONST. amend. 14 § 5, enforcement 
of that right.  Leave aside the seemingly obvious doctrinal objections to calling “unreasonable” or 
“discriminatory” a state gun law that otherwise complied with the Second Amendment (as the host 
state’s law would have to be assumed to do) and imposed the same requirements on resident and 
visitor alike.  Rather, consider the implications.  If a CCR statute was held to be appropriate 
enforcement legislation enforcing this right, query, for example, whether Congress could also 
enforce the interstate travel right by mandating that a visitor from a state with a highly protective 
“stand your ground” law could assert that right when traveling in a state with a less protective law.  
The highly likely answer to that latter question—an emphatic “no”—would presumably require the 
same result for a right-to-travel enforcement defense of CCR legislation. 
 92.  See, e.g., Araiza, Arming supra note 69; Christopher Schmidt, Originalism and 
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33 (2018) 
(responding to that article); Darrell A. H. Miller, Dignity and Second Amendment Enforcement—
Response to William D. Araiza’s Arming the Second Amendment and Enforcing the Fourteenth, 75 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 438 (2018) (same). 
 93.  To be sure, Heller and McDonald together mean that these different regimes are all 
subject to a federal constitutional floor, which mitigates at least some of the divergence noted in 
the text. 
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in the context of the Second Amendment.  The legitimate scope of that power 
poses a difficult question.  However, the status of a CCR law as Second 
Amendment enforcement legislation does not. 
C.  The Full Faith and Credit Guarantee 
A final potential source of constitutional authority for Congress to enact 
CCR legislation is its power under the Full Faith and Credit guarantee of 
Article IV, Section 1.94  As a general matter, that provision speaks to the 
effect sister states must give to a state’s official pronouncements and 
decisions.  Given the gist of CCR legislation as designed to force states to 
honor another state’s concealed carry permits, one can easily understand why 
this provision—and, in particular, Congress’s powers under it—have been 
cited as a possible source of authority for such a law.95
While the first sentence of Section 1, the so-called “Full Faith and 
Credit” Clause, prescribes a self-executing rule, the provision’s relevance for 
CCR legislation lies in its second sentence, known as the “Effects” Clause.  
The Effects Clause provides that “the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which [the public] Acts, Records and Proceedings 
[referred to in the first sentence] shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”  
The relevance of the Effects Clause power to CCR legislation implicates a 
variety of issues, some of which have not been conclusively established and 
about which there remains significant scholarly disagreement.  This sub-Part 
merely identifies those issues, without purporting to offer a definitive 
analysis of them. 
1.  The Provision’s Subjects 
At first blush, the first question—what are “public Acts, Records and 
Proceedings”?—is perhaps susceptible to a fairly clear answer.  As Professor 
Ralph Whitten, a leading scholar of the full faith and credit provision, notes, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself (and thus the subsequent Effects 
Clause) applies to “the public acts (or statutes), non-judicial records, and 
 94.  “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other state.  And the Congress may be general Laws prescribe the Manner in 
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”  U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1. 
 95.  See Letter from Stephen Sachs, Professor of Law Duke University School of Law, Randy 
Barnett, Director of Georgetown Center for the Constitution at Georgetown University Law Center, 
and William Baude, Assistant Professor of Law Chicago Law School to the Hons. Trey Gowdy, 
Richard Hudson, and Justin Amash (March 23, 2017), reprinted at
http://www.stevesachs.com/HR38_SachsBarnettBaudeLtr_20170323.pdf (urging that Congress 
rely on this power for CCR legislation). 
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judicial proceedings (or judgments) of each state.”96  But ambiguities 
immediately cloud this seemingly straightforward (and comprehensive) 
accounting of the items subject to the full faith and credit provision.  Those 
definitional ambiguities (and others, as noted below) arose from the debate 
over same-sex marriage in the two decades between Hawaii’s first tentative 
steps toward same-sex marriage rights97 and Obergefell v. Hodges’s98
nationalization of that right.  In particular, they arose in the context of the 
debate about what, if anything, the Full Faith and Credit Clause said about 
states’ obligations to honor out-of-state same-sex marriages99 and about 
whether Congress could use the Effects Clause to authorize states to refuse 
to honor such marriages.100
With regard to the class of state actions that are subject to the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, Professor Whitten questioned the status of a marriage 
license as a “record” that was subject to the Clause.  Instead, he suggested, a 
marriage license or any other state-granted license101 “is simply evidence of 
some right or privilege granted by the laws of a state.”  Thus, according to 
Professor Whitten, if a person who (pre-Obergefell) entered into a same-sex 
marriage in State A sought State B’s recognition of the marriage license State 
A granted him, the full faith and credit argument for such recognition would 
rest on State B’s obligation to give full faith and credit to State A’s “public 
Acts.”102
Of course, the significance, if any, of the difference between a state’s 
obligation to give full faith and credit to another state’s “Records” and its 
obligation to give full faith and credit to a state’s “public Acts” depends on 
the significance of its respective underlying obligations.  This sub-Part now 
turns briefly to that question. 
 96.  Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 465, 466 
(2005).
 97.  See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii could ban same-sex 
couples from marrying only if that prohibition could satisfy strict scrutiny). 
 98.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 99.  Compare, e.g., David Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 7 
(1997) (concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require states to honor out-of-state 
solemnized same-sex marriages) with Evan Wolfson & Michael Meicher, A House Divided: An 
Argument Against the Defense of Marriage Act, 58 OR. STATE BAR BULLETIN 17, 17–18 (1998) 
(suggesting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause might require states to honor such marriages). 
 100.  See infra note 117 (citing scholarly analyses coming to differing conclusions on the 
Effects Clause question with regard to DOMA). 
 101.  See Whitten, supra note 96, at 477.  Indeed, Professor Whitten used a concealed carry 
license as his example.   
 102.  See id. at 479 (“I hope that enough has been said to convince the reader that the issue of 
concern in interjurisdictional marriage enforcement cases is full faith and credit to state public 
acts . . . .”). 
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2.  The Clause’s Self-Executing Force 
Scholars disagree on the obligations that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause imposes on states.  As one recent review of the scholarship explained, 
“Until recently, most modern scholarship on the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause . . . accepted the premise, found in the Supreme Court’s precedent, 
that the first portion of the Clause provided a substantive command requiring 
states to give conclusive effect to state judgments and—in certain 
situations—to state acts.”103  In particular, that traditional view has 
distinguished between a sister state’s judicial judgments and its laws (or 
“public Acts”),104 with the former subject to a much stricter constitutional 
insistence on sister-state enforcement.105
Thus, to the extent concealed carry licenses are best understood as 
public Acts, as Professor Whitten suggests,106 the traditional view would 
suggest that any substantive requirement the Clause imposes is less stringent 
than the analogous requirement as applied to a judicial judgment.  If one 
accepts all of (1) Professor Whitten’s definitional analysis, (2) the traditional 
view of the Clause’s substantive force but also (3) its relatively weaker 
impact on “public Acts” as opposed to judgments, then it is at least possible 
that an Effects Clause statute requiring enforcement of another state’s 
concealed carry permits might face stronger constitutional headwinds—or at 
least less of a presumption of constitutionality.  This is a highly speculative 
argument, however. 
Regardless, the traditional view has come under attack.  As the review 
cited above went on to explain, “[a] growing number of scholars”107 have 
come to question the idea that the Clause has a substantive impact.  Instead, 
those scholars argue that the Clause’s self-executing force lay simply in its 
mandate that states admit such “public Acts, Records and judicial 
Proceedings” “as conclusive proof that such proceedings took place (i.e., as 
conclusive proof that the court of another state rendered such a judgment or 
that the legislature of another state passed such an act).”108  Thus, on this 
 103.  Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 485, 487 (2013). 
 104.  See Whitten, supra note 96. 
 105.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is 
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20 (1997).   
 106.  See supra text accompanying note 102 (noting Professor Whitten’s suggestion to this 
effect in the analogous context of marriage licenses). 
 107.  See supra text accompanying note 102 (noting Professor Whitten’s suggestion to this 
effect in the analogous context of marriage licenses). 
 108.  Id.
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theory, the self-executing force of the Clause simply amounts to an 
evidentiary rule.109
As noted above, the outcome of this debate could conceivably bear on 
the extent of Congress’s power under the Effects Clause.  Because a full 
analysis of this debate is far beyond its scope, this Article brackets [it], and 
moves on to focus explicitly on the Effects Clause. 
3.  Congressional Power Under the Effects Clause 
The question of Congress’s power under the second sentence of the 
Clause is clouded by the fact that Congress has very rarely invoked it.110  As 
a result, courts have had few occasions to opine on and establish its scope. 
The text of the Effects Clause suggests that Congress’s power is broad 
indeed.  It authorizes Congress both to “prescribe the Manner in which such 
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,” and also to “prescribe . . . 
the Effect thereof.”111  With regard to the first of these powers, one might 
initially think that it provides ample authority for subsection (c)(1)’s 
provision that possession of a “facially valid” identification document and 
concealed carry permit constitutes “prima facie evidence” that the individual 
has the federally-required state-issued license. 
Still, this argument is not free of ambiguity.  The context for the Effects 
Clause was likely anticipated to be a state’s judicial process, not an on-the-
street law enforcement action where this provision of subsection (c)(1) 
would likely be most frequently employed.112  Moreover, if the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause guarantees the conclusive authenticity of a sister state’s 
records, one might argue that subsection (c)(1)’s provision for more tentative 
authentication is an odd fit with—and thus perhaps an inappropriate use of—
the Effects Clause’s grant of power to vindicate the earlier Clause’s self-
 109.  See, e.g., Whitten, supra note 96, at 466 (“Translated into modern parlance, the first 
sentence of the clause commanded that the public acts (or statutes), non-judicial records, and 
judicial proceedings (or judgments) of each state had to be admitted into evidence as conclusive 
proof of their own existence and contents–i.e., as proof that such a statute, record, or judgment 
actually existed and dealt with the matters contained in the (properly authenticated) copy of the 
statute, record, or judgment presented to the court that was being asked to recognize it.”); Stephen 
E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (2009) “[T]he 
only self-executing portion of the Clause was evidentiary in nature: it obliged states to admit sister-
state records into evidence but did not mandate the substantive effect those records should have.”). 
 110.  See, e.g., Wolfson & Meicher, supra note 99, at 18 (noting that prior to 1996 Congress 
had only invoked this power on four occasions, two of which involved legislation that simply 
prescribed methods for authenticating sister states’ official records). 
 111.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 112.  See infra text accompanying note 152 (noting the practical relevance of this question for 
the Effects Clause foundation for the prima facie evidence provision); see also Shearer, supra note 
5, at 439–40 (noting the potential difficulties police officers might face when having to apply this 
provision).
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executing authentication.  At the very least, if Congress relied on the Effects 
Clause as support for this provision of subsection (c)(1), the novelty of this 
type of use of the Clause would require some careful thinking on these 
questions. 
With regard to Congress’s power to “prescribe . . . the Effect” of those 
state documents, Professor Michael McConnell has argued that that Clause’s 
language provides Congress with a broad power allowing it to “prescribe that 
a particular class of acts will have no effect at all, or that their effect will be 
confined to their state of origin.”113  Other scholars have resisted this 
argument, which is relevant both to Congress’s power to enact an arguably 
weaker recognition rule than that required by the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause’s self-executing requirement114 and to the scope of Congress’s power 
more generally.  Professor Laurence Tribe has analogized the Effects Clause 
to Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that 
Congress can expand a state’s full faith and credit obligation beyond the 
constitutionally-required minimum, but cannot restrict it.115  Professor 
Andrew Koppelman embraced that same conclusion via a textual argument.  
He has argued that Congress’s power under the Effects Clause should be 
interpreted in light of the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s affirmative mandate 
to states to accord full faith and credit; thus, he concludes that Congress’s 
power should not be read “in a way that contradicts [the prior Clause’s] self-
executing command.”116
This discussion also played out against the backdrop of the same-sex 
marriage debate of the last two decades.  In this case, the Effects Clause 
discussion concerned Congress’s enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), one provision of which, grounded on its power under the Effects 
Clause, authorized states to refuse legal recognition to same-sex marriages 
legally performed in other states.  Because DOMA cabined rather than 
extended the scope of states’ full faith and credit obligations, the debate over 
 113.  Koppelman, supra note 105, at 20 (quoting Professor McConnell’s letter to Congress as 
it was considering the Defense of Marriage Act). 
 114  See text accompanying supra note 112 (providing one example of this issue). 
 115.  See id. at 19 (quoting Professor Tribe’s letter to Congress as it was considering the same 
legislation that motivated Professor McConnell’s letter). 
 116.  Id. at 21. 
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its constitutionality117 is not directly relevant to the analogous debate over 
CCR legislation’s foundation in the Effects Clause.118
Nevertheless, the DOMA debate does reflect several considerations that 
are relevant to the CCR issue.  Perhaps most foundational is the question 
whether the full faith and credit provision points unambiguously toward 
national uniformity.  Some scholars attacking DOMA’s constitutionality 
suggested that it does—on that ground, they argued that DOMA’s 
authorization to states to refuse to recognize other states’ same-sex marriages 
was unconstitutional.119  Other scholars disagreed, citing the guarantee’s dual 
goals of uniformity and state autonomy—or, as one commentator put it, “a 
union of a certain kind: a union of meaningfully empowered sub-federal 
polities.”120  Again, to the extent this debate played out against the backdrop 
of DOMA, which sought to authorize disuniformity on the relevant question 
(the legal status of same-sex marriages), the uniformity/state autonomy 
distinction sounds in a different register in the CCR debate, in which the 
federal law in question seeks to impose uniformity at least of a sort—that is, 
uniformity via nationwide reciprocity.121
This distinct character of CCR legislation raises another question, one 
that again appeared in the DOMA debate.  That debate featured arguments 
that DOMA, by selecting particular types of state legal actions for 
unfavorable sister-state treatment, unconstitutionally singled-out certain 
types of state laws for unfavorable sister-state treatment.  According to 
Professor Laurence Tribe, this feature of DOMA, if valid, would necessarily 
mean that “Congress can pick and choose any substantive field governed by 
state law . . . and render ‘any State’s official acts, on any subject, to second-
class status’ that need not receive full faith and credit, undermining the 
‘Tenth Amendment’s unambiguous language, that ours is a National 
Government whose powers are limited to those enumerated in the 
Constitution itself.’”122
 117.  Compare, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 105 (arguing that DOMA was unconstitutional) 
with Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Not Yet (?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence,
Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the Constitution 
Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915 (2006) (reaching a tentatively opposing conclusion). 
 118.  But see text accompanying supra note 112 (providing one example where the DOMA 
model might conceivably be more directly relevant). 
 119.  See, e.g., Koppleman, supra note 105 at 22; Rosen, supra note 117, at 934 (quoting 
Professor Tribe to this effect). 
 120.  Rosen, supra note 117, at 937. 
 121.  See text accompanying supra note 83 (noting the standardizing effect of CCR legislation). 
 122.  Rosen, supra note 117, at 939 (quoting Professor Tribe’s letter to Congress); see also
Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic Relations Conflicts 
Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1999) (arguing that DOMA violates state sovereignty 
“because it invalidates state judgments based on their content alone”). 
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 50 Side B      02/26/2019   14:13:21
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 50 Side B      02/26/2019   14:13:21
ARAIZA_MACRO_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2019 5:19 PM
594 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:3 
Again, the unique effect of CCR legislation requires that we translate 
these arguments.  The approximate idea would be that CCR legislation, by 
identifying a species of state actions (here, grants of concealed carry permits) 
for particularly favorable123 full faith and credit treatment, amounts less to a 
general, nationwide choice-of-law rule and more to a substantive insistence 
that one state’s laws on a given topic be given “first class status.”124  So 
understood, this translation reveals the fundamentally different nature of the 
arguments in these two cases.  Professor Tribe’s anti-DOMA argument 
appears to rest on a concern that DOMA would relegate a pro-marriage-
equality state’s laws to “second-class status” if, as DOMA authorized, a state 
could refuse to honor that state’s same-sex marriages.  The analogous 
concern with CCR legislation would have to be understood as the mirror 
image of this argument: essentially, a CCR law would allow a permissive 
concealed carry state’s laws to trump a more restrictive state’s laws, by 
allowing a permissive state’s permit-holder to travel to the more restrictive 
state and flout that latter state’s more stringent laws.125
The highly imperfect nature of this translation (indeed, its character as 
the mirror image of the anti-DOMA argument) means that we would need to 
think hard about whether CCR legislation would impact state sovereign 
prerogatives to the same degree Professor Tribe alleged that DOMA did.  
Presumably, the analogous potential constitutional flaw CCR legislation 
would lie in the principle, reflected in the Tenth Amendment, that within its 
sphere of authority a state retains the prerogative to regulate its citizenry as 
it (and its citizenry) see fit.  Of course, this principle would be subject to 
federal power to preempt such choices, if the constitutional authority for such 
preemption exists.  Thus, just as one participant in the DOMA debate 
correctly observed in that context, the Tenth Amendment argument in the 
 123.  The word “favorable” is italicized to distinguish the treatment the affected state law 
would receive under CCR legislation as compared with the unfavorable treatment the relevant state 
law would receive in Professor Tribe’s argument against DOMA. 
 124.  Cf. text accompanying supra note 122 (quoting a source attacking DOMA for singling 
out certain states’ laws on certain topics for “second class status”); see also supra, note 123 (again 
flagging this distinction). 
 125.  To be sure, it is possible to map DOMA more precisely onto CCR legislation.  One could 
argue that a CCR law would cast a more gun-restrictive state’s laws into the same “second class 
status” into which DOMA allegedly cast the laws of marriage-equality jurisdictions.  But this 
argument seems weak: Under CCR legislation a gun-restrictive state’s laws are not really being 
ignored or refused effect by sister states.  At most, they would simply have little practical relevance, 
as gun carriers flocked to more permissive states to obtain their permits.  This is not to say that 
therefore the more restrictive state is not suffering an injury to its sovereign interests.  But the injury 
would have to be expressed differently, as set forth in the text paragraph following this footnote. 
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CCR context would collapse back on the question whether the Effects Clause 
authorized CCR legislation.126
This last insight suggests that debates about the extent of Congress’s 
power under the Effects Clause might degenerate into an unhelpful 
circularity.  But the circle could be broken.  First, the Effects Clause’s 
explicit proviso that such federal legislation take the form of “general 
laws”127 might be read as requiring that Effects Clause legislation be what 
one commenter on DOMA called “content neutral”128—that is, less explicitly 
focused on one regulatory area.  Another participant in the DOMA debate, 
one generally critical of this argument, nevertheless conceded that it rested 
on a “plausible textual basis.”129  If accepted, this argument would 
presumably cast serious doubt on the Effects Clause foundation for CCR 
legislation.130
Second, such circularity could be broken by a judicial decision that 
embraces a substantive vision of federalism that is inconsistent with the 
effect of CCR legislation.  This vision might simply insist that, whatever the 
Effects Clause authorizes, it does not allow Congress to override any state’s 
legitimate police power regulation by insisting that that state apply another 
state’s law simpliciter.131  This vision is not implausible.  After all, the Court 
in United States v. Lopez never denied that possession of a gun in a school 
zone in fact affected interstate commerce; instead, it held that it could not 
conclude that such possession counted legally as interstate commerce subject 
 126.  See Rosen, supra note 117, at 939 (describing arguments like this as “parasitic on the 
conclusion that the Effects Clause does not authorize Congress to enact DOMA.”). 
 127.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 128.  Cox, supra note 122, at 1081–82. 
 129.  Rosen, supra note 117, at 941.  However, another commenter has observed that Congress 
has in fact legislated under the Effects Clause to require that states honor a particular class of 
judicial judgments.  See Julie L.B. Johnson, The Meaning of ‘General Laws’: The Extent of 
Congress’s Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense 
of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1642–43 (1997) (discussing federal legislation under 
the Effects Clause mandating sister-state recognition of judgments related to child support, child 
custody, and protection orders); id. at 1622 n.56 (citing such laws). 
 130.  For a discussion of the Clause’s requirement that congressional action be taken via 
“general Laws,” see Johnson, supra note 129.  
 131.  Cf. Whitten, supra note 96 (arguing that full faith and credit for items such as marriage 
and concealed carry licenses should be understood in the context of full faith and credit for the laws 
of the state that issue such a license).  For a discussion of the question whether the Constitution 
speaks to choice-of-law issues of the sort implicit in CCR reciprocity legislation, see Douglas 
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of 
Choice-of-Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); id. at 251 (offering as one of three constitutional 
principles governing choice of law that “the fundamental allocation of authority among states is 
territorial,” and arguing that “all choice-of-law rules must be consistent with, and derived from, the 
fundamentally territorial allocation of authority among the states. . . .  [A] state’s claim to regulate 
behavior or to govern a dispute must be based on some thing or event within its territory.”). 
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to federal regulation, given the effect such a holding would have in 
eviscerating any realm of regulation reserved to the states.132  Similarly, a 
court might suggest that the Effects Clause simply cannot be read as 
authorizing Congress to single out a particular state’s law on a particular 
subject and cram it down the throats of sister states—especially when that 
federal mandate would have a clear substantive effect.133
These arguments are speculative and subject to a great deal of debate.  
Again, given the paucity of caselaw on the scope of Congress’s power under 
the Effects Clause, they remain open questions that require careful study. 
III.  Constitutional Defenses 
In addition to the issues Part II has sketched out, CCR legislation raises 
difficult questions about what this Article calls “constitutional defenses.”  
Such “defenses” do not address the preliminary question of whether a 
constitutional source of authority exists for a CCR statute.  Rather, they 
assume such a source exists and consider instead whether such legislation 
would still be unconstitutional, because it would transgress an affirmative 
limit on Congress’s authority.  This part of the Article addresses two such 
limits: the anti-commandeering principle, and the non-delegation doctrine. 
A.  The Anti-Commandeering Defense 
Even if a federal law reflects an otherwise-constitutional use of 
Congress’s Article I powers, the possibility always remains that it violates 
the federalism implications of the Tenth Amendment.134  In the case of CCR 
legislation, the most notable of such limits is the anti-commandeering 
concept adopted by the Court in New York v. United States.135  As readers 
 132.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563–64 (1995); see also Jones v. United States, 
529 U.S. 848, 858 (noting this concern in Lopez).
 133.  See Johnson, supra note 129 (suggesting how such congressional actions might violate 
the Effects Clause’s “general Laws” proviso); Koppelman, supra note 105 (noting how the 
traditional view of the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposed a stricter sister-state obligation with 
regard to judicial judgments and a less stringent obligation with regard to “public Acts”); see also
supra note 102 (quoting a leading full faith and credit scholar’s conclusion that state-granted 
licenses should be understood as “public Acts” for full faith and credit purposes). 
 134.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (“Congress exercises its 
conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution.  Thus, for example, under 
the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate commerce, but 
Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the First Amendment.  The Tenth 
Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress . . . .”).  Whether this same limitation applies 
to the other possible sources of authority for a CCR statute presents an interesting question.  See
text accompanying infra note 175 (discussing this question in the context of the Enforcement 
Clause); infra note 152 (discussing this question in the context of the Effects Clause). 
 135.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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will likely know, the Court has held that even laws otherwise within 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power to enact are unconstitutional if they 
direct, or “commandeer,” the actions of states in their capacities as sovereign 
legislators or law enforcers. 
Thus, in New York, the Court struck down a provision of a federal law 
regulating the disposal of low-level radioactive waste that offered the states 
a choice of either taking title to any such waste produced within its borders 
or legislating a solution to the disposal problem pursuant to federally-
mandated standards.  The Court described the first of these options as “no 
different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments 
to radioactive waste producers.”136  More relevantly, the Court described the 
second option—that states craft a legislative solution based on federal 
standards—as “commandeering” state governments by forcing their 
legislatures to prioritize one policy issue for resolution over others.137
Five years after New York, in Printz v. United States,138 the Court 
extended the anti-commandeering principle to apply to state law 
enforcement.139  In Printz, the Court struck down a provision of a federal gun 
control law that required local law enforcement officials to conduct 
background checks of prospective firearms purchasers in certain instances.  
Applying similar reasoning as in New York, the Court extended the anti-
commandeering concept to state law enforcement.  At the same time, the 
Court, presumably anticipating the logical next question after its ruling, 
explicitly endorsed federal “commandeering” of state judiciaries as 
constitutionally unobjectionable.140
1.  The Basic Argument 
The anti-commandeering argument against CCR legislation is 
seemingly straightforward.141  The argument is that a local police officer 
finding a concealed weapon on an individual would be required to enforce 
the federal reciprocity rule, and thus honor an out-of-state concealed carry 
permit, but only if the officer determined that the out-of-state permit was in 
fact valid and that the individual possessed the requisite ID specified in the 
 136.  N.Y., 505 U.S. at 175. 
 137.  See id. at 175–76. 
 138.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 139.  Id.
 140.  See id. at 928–29 (1997) (distinguishing federal commandeering of state judiciaries on 
the authority of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)). 
 141.  Other commenters have identified different anti-commandeering problems with CCR 
legislation. See Shearer, supra note 5.  
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statute.142  Indeed, subsection (c) of the bill explicitly limits the ability of 
local police to arrest or detain persons for illegal gun possession, even to the 
point of prescribing the probative effect of a person’s presentation of the 
permit and identification on the question whether that person falls within the 
class of persons permitted to possess a concealed weapon.143  Thus, one 
might intuitively understand the CCR bill as a federal direction to local law 
enforcement about how they should do their jobs, even to the point of 
prescribing federal standards governing their decisions whether or not to 
arrest or detain someone. 
Nevertheless, this initial argument quickly encounters complexities. 
2.  The Analogy to the Brady Act 
One entry point into these complexities is the question whether the 
burden on state law enforcement CCR legislation imposes can be analogized 
to the burden the Brady Act unconstitutionally imposed on local 
jurisdictions’ “chief law enforcement officers” (“CLEOs”), who were 
required to conduct the background checks the federal law mandated.  In 
Printz, the Court concluded that that federal mandate issued to CLEOs 
compelled them to “administer a federal program,”144 and thus violated the 
anti-commandeering principle.  Would the CCR bill do the same? 
One preliminary defense of the CCR bill can be rejected at the outset: 
In Printz, the Court rejected the argument that the onerousness of the federal 
obligation was relevant to the commandeering question.145  Thus, an 
argument focusing on the relative ease of complying with the federal 
mandate would be unavailing against a commandeering challenge.  But other 
defenses require more thought.  One might defend the CCR bill from an anti-
commandeering challenge on the ground that the bill would impose no 
freestanding obligation on the part of local law enforcement to do anything.  
 142.  See H.R. 38 §101 (a) 
 143.  Curiously, Section 102 of the bill, titled “Rule of Construction,” appears to limit this 
restriction on police conduct by allowing short investigatory stops.  See H.R. 38 § 102 (“Nothing 
in this title prohibits a law enforcement officer with reasonable suspicion of a violation of any law 
from conducting a brief investigative stop in accordance with the Constitution of the United 
States.”).  This provision is clearly designed to allow police officers to make the investigative stops 
the Supreme Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968).  Thus, if subsection (c)(1)’s protection against “detention” means anything, it presumably 
means a protection against something more substantial than what has become known as a “Terry
stop,” but something less substantial than an arrest, which subsection (c)(1) mentions 
independently. See text accompanying infra notes 154-156 (considering this issue further). 
 144.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 933. 
 145.  See, e.g., United States v. California, 314 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1089 (E.D. Ca. 2018) (“Even 
requiring state officers to perform discrete, ministerial tasks violates the [anticommandeering] 
doctrine.”) (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 929–30). 
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This defense would seek to distinguish the law struck down in Printz, which 
required the CLEO to respond to an individual’s attempted purchase of a 
weapon by making reasonable efforts to determine whether the purchase was 
legal.146  By contrast, one might argue, a local officer’s obligation to comply 
with the federal standards in the CCR bill would arise only upon the officer’s 
independent decision to investigate a case of possible illegal gun possession. 
But this defense of the CCR bill hardly seems adequate.  If a local police 
officer in a concealed carry state encounters an individual concealing a 
weapon, one would expect the officer in many or most cases to investigate 
whether that concealed possession was lawful.  In turn, upon being presented 
with the individual’s out-of-state permit and then applying the standards set 
forth in the federal law, the officer would presumably be “administer[ing] a 
federal program,”147 one that has its own requirements and standards, which 
might be quite different from those of the host state.  Indeed, even assuming 
that the onerousness of the federal mandate was relevant to the 
commandeering question,148 one might easily conclude that “administer[ing] 
[that] federal program”149 would be quite complex, given the officer’s need 
to determine even the “facial”150 validity of the out-of-state permit.151
Onerousness aside, state law enforcement discretion would be 
significantly limited by subsection (c)(1)’s provision that possession of 
“facially valid” documents specified in subsection (a) constitutes “prima 
facie evidence” that the individual possesses the federally-required state-
issued license.  Presumably, states retain the authority, subject to 
constitutional limits, to determine what constitutes adequate evidence of a 
particular asserted fact, such as the possession of a valid state concealed-
carry license.  Subsection (c)(1)’s determination of the probative value of a 
particular piece of paper, and its direction to local police to give that paper a 
particular evidentiary weight, imposes a federal rule of conduct the state 
officer is required to apply.  It is not hard to imagine its effect on local law 
enforcement.  For example, consider a scenario in which discovery of several 
forged concealed carry permits in the area leads local police to be extra 
careful about the validity of permits proffered by persons found to be 
 146.  See Printz, 521 U.S. at 903. 
 147.  Id. at 933. 
 148.  But see supra text accompanying note 145. 
 149.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 933. 
 150.  See H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101 (c)(1) (2017). 
 151.  See Shearer, supra note 5, at 439 (noting the difficulty of performing this task). 
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carrying a weapon.  Subsection (c)(1)’s prima facie provision would directly 
impede a police decision to scrutinize such permits with extra care.152
Perhaps even more significantly, subsection (c)(1)’s limitation on state 
law enforcement officers’ ability to “arrest[]” or “detain[]”153 an individual 
for any firearms possession-related offense without probable cause to believe 
that the federal law’s provisions are being violated constitutes a direct federal 
command to state law enforcement.  One might initially think that this 
command precludes the sort of pre-probable cause/pre-arrest questioning 
and pat-downs the Constitution allows law enforcement to perform,154 and 
that presumably are an accepted practice in many police departments; 
however, Section 102 of the bill appears to expressly disclaim any intent to 
restrict such investigative stops.155
This raises the question of what precisely this part of subsection (c)(1) 
accomplishes, given that, at one extreme, Section 102 allows investigative 
“Terry stops”156 and that, at the other, probable cause is required for an arrest.  
Assuming that Section 102 accomplishes something, it presumably prevents 
“detentions” longer than short Terry stops that are supported by less than 
probable cause.  Perhaps such detentions would take the form of longer 
detentions while the police officer confirmed the validity of the permit.  
(Indeed, this explanation would explain why this provision and the prima
facie evidence provision appear in the same subsection.)  But regardless, 
assuming that the detention protection provision means something, it 
necessarily commands law enforcement to follow federal procedures when 
investigating crime and making detention decisions.  As such, this provision 
intrudes, potentially deeply, into local police procedures, commanding local 
 152.  Of course, this provision could be constitutionally grounded in the Effects Clause, 
discussed in Part II (C), supra. But see text accompanying supra note 104 (querying whether the 
Effects Clause appropriately applies to on-the-ground police practices).  A grounding of this 
provision in the Effects Clause would in turn raise the question whether the anti-commandeering 
limitation would apply to legislation grounded in that Clause.  This is an interesting question: since 
the anti-commandeering limitation does not apply to state judiciaries.  See Printz, 521 U.S. at 298–
29, most such legislation would not implicate this issue, since presumably most such legislation 
would be aimed at state courts.  But that might make it more likely that the anti-commandeering 
limitation could be applied to such legislation, for example, when it impacted on-the-ground police 
procedure rather than state judicial procedure, since imposing such a limitation would not constitute 
a severe limitation on congressional power under that clause more generally.  There is no 
conceptual reason that Effects Clause legislation would automatically be immune from federalism-
based limits.  See, e.g., Letter from Stephen Sachs, et al., supra note 95 (describing as “at best 
unclear” whether the Effects Clause, unlike the Commerce Clause, “confers any power to abrogate 
[state] sovereign immunity.”). 
 153.  See H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101 (c)(1) (2017). 
 154.  See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 155.  See supra text accompanying note 143. 
 156.  See id.
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law enforcement to police according to federal-mandated standards as part 
of their administration of the federal reciprocity program. 
3.  A Choice of Law Rule? 
But these conclusions are not free of ambiguity.  As noted by the earlier 
sketched-out objection to the commandeering argument, it remains the case 
that the officer’s obligation to administer the federal reciprocity program 
arises only upon the voluntary decision of the officer to apply the state’s own 
concealed carry restrictions and investigate the legality of the concealed 
possession.  This reality implies an understanding of the federal bill as 
simply a choice of law provision, with the officer required to apply the 
federal rule (and thus honor the out-of-state permit) only upon his voluntary 
decision to investigate the gun possession. 
Thus, one could distinguish the officer’s duties under the CCR bill from 
a CLEO’s obligations under the Brady Act, on the theory that the latter law 
both explicitly imposed an obligation on the CLEO (to conduct the 
background check) and further that the burden it imposed might have been 
qualitatively different from any burden he otherwise had under state law.  In 
other words, while a local police officer encountering a concealed weapon 
would presumably proceed to apply his own state’s concealed carry law on 
his own, non-commandeered, initiative, altering his conduct only if the 
individual in question produced not a local permit but an out-of-state one, 
under the Brady Act a CLEO might be required to do something (perform a 
background check) that he otherwise would not have done under his own 
state’s law.  Indeed, this distinction finds indirect support in the fact that the 
CLEO-conducted background checks the Brady Act mandated applied when 
the state did not otherwise have an instant background check and when the 
weapons purchaser did not already possess a state-issued permit issued after 
a background check.157  In sum, potentially unlike the CCR bill, the Brady 
Act did seem to impose a new type of obligation on the CLEO. 
But again this analysis is clouded once one considers other examples.  
Consider a local jurisdiction’s policy decision that police officers not inquire 
into a victim’s or witness’s immigration status when voluntarily initiating a 
conversation with that victim or witness.  Would a federal mandate 
prohibiting such local rules—or, indeed, mandating that local law 
enforcement in fact make such inquiries—simply furnish a choice-of-law 
rule requiring adherence to the federal standard, once the police officer had 
already exercised her discretion to engage with the victim or witness?  Or 
 157.  See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902–03. 
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would it conscript the local officer as an enforcer of federal law, as prohibited 
by Printz?
4. Murphy v. NCAA
The Court’s most recent commandeering case may provide an answer 
to this puzzle.  In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”)158 the Court struck down the federal Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) on the theory that it commandeered state 
legislative choices.  As relevant for our purposes, PASPA prevented any 
state beyond those that already allowed professional sports betting from 
legalizing it.159
The Supreme Court held that PASPA did indeed commandeer states.  
Speaking through Justice Alito, the Court distinguished PASPA from federal 
laws that accomplished uncontroversial federal preemption of state law.  
Justice Alito explained that such preemptive laws operated on individuals, 
giving them a right to engage in particular conduct regardless of any 
conflicting state law.160  He stated that this analysis applied even to 
preemptive laws that spoke directly to states, for example, by forbidding 
them from enforcing any requirements that conflicted with the federal rule.  
Such provisions, Justice Alito noted, simply “confer on private entities . . . a 
federal right to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal) 
constraints.”161  By contrast, he observed that PASPA’s prohibition on state 
action legalizing sports betting did not regulate private parties at all.  As he 
explained, a private party that engaged in sports betting would not be 
violating federal law; rather, PASPA advanced the federal policy disfavoring 
such betting solely by prohibiting states from allowing it.  Such a prohibition, 
he concluded, amounted to unconstitutional commandeering. 
At one level, Murphy’s distinction between commandeering and 
preemption suggests that the federal reciprocal concealed carry bill does not 
run afoul of the commandeering prohibition.  After all, subsection (a) is 
phrased explicitly as a grant to private persons of a federal right to concealed 
carry, if a person satisfies that subsection’s criteria.  Nevertheless, this 
answer still fails to address questions about subsection (c)’s direction to local 
law enforcement, both to refrain from arresting or detaining persons unless 
 158.  Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1462 (2018). 
 159.  The law carved out New Jersey, which was given one year from the law’s enactment to 
decide whether to allow sports betting in Atlantic City.  The state initially declined to do so, but 
after the one year period passed it changed its mind and authorized it, prompting the NCAA to sue, 
alleging a violation of PASPA.  
 160.  See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479–81. 
 161.  Id. at 1480.  
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probable cause exists to believe that the person is violating the federal rule 
of conduct and also to give certain documentation particular evidentiary 
effect. 
Unlike PASPA, which was clearly a regulation of the state, the CCR 
bill is ambiguous on that crucial point.  Subsection (a) might be understood 
as a grant of a federal license (via the other state’s concealed carry license), 
while subsection (c) might be understood as a mandate requiring state law 
enforcement to conduct its business in a particular way.  Indeed, the best 
reading of subsection (c) is that its direction to state police to refrain both 
from arresting or even detaining individuals with facially valid out-of-state 
carry licenses regulates how local law enforcement use their law 
enforcement discretion, by restricting them from taking law enforcement 
steps the Constitution permits them to take.162  Similarly, subsection (c)’s 
provision of a federal rule of evidence for local law enforcement to apply 
appears to regulate how a state determines the probative weight of particular 
pieces of evidence. 
Taken together, it is hard to see subsection (c) as anything other than an 
instruction to local police to follow the federal law enforcement rule, rather 
than a regulation of a private party that merely preempts inconsistent state 
regulation.163  If one takes seriously Murphy’s distinction between laws that 
regulate governments and laws that regulate individuals, this provision of 
subsection (c) should be understood as a federal directive to state law 
enforcement, and thus invalid under the anti-commandeering principle. 
Consider perhaps the strongest contrary argument.  This argument 
would describe the CCR bill as granting a nationwide federal concealed carry 
license to persons who have a valid state license.  This description would 
bring it within Murphy’s description of a purely preemptive federal 
regulation of individual parties.164 Indeed, one could analogize the holder of 
the federally-endorsed state-issued concealed carry permit with Thomas 
Gibbons from Gibbons v. Ogden,165 who held a federal coasting license that 
the Supremacy Clause required New York authorities to recognize as 
superseding Aaron Ogden’s conflicting state-granted monopoly.  On this 
argument, subsection (c)’s provisions might be justified as providing merely 
the procedural details governing how that individual right is to be vindicated.  
 162.  See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
 163.  In particular, it makes no sense to think of an evidentiary rule in this context as regulating 
private parties, since the only function of such a rule would be to direct a police decision about the 
existence of evidence rendering the gun possession legal. 
 164.  See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (offering as an example of a preemptive federal law rather 
than an illegitimately-commandeering one a federal statute that “confers on private entities . . . a 
federal right to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal) constraints.”). 
 165.  22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
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In particular, one could argue that the detention provision ensures that the 
holder of the out-of-state permit enjoys a degree of substantive liberty when 
exercising his federally-granted right, subject only to subsection (c)’s 
evidentiary rule. 
But this final step seems one too far.  The best way to read subsection 
(c) is as a regulation of how state officials should go about using their law 
enforcement discretion.  First, subsection (c) is—indeed, can only be read 
as—a direct regulation of states.  It is not phrased as a grant of a license to 
private parties,166 and, as a prescription of particular police procedures, it 
cannot be so read if Murphy’s distinction between regulation of states and 
regulation of individuals is to be accorded any force.167
Second, subsection (c) clearly directs how state officials—here, state 
law enforcement—perform their duties, and vetoes certain decisions, such as 
to detain a person while investigating his concealed carry permit.  To quote 
Murphy, under PASPA “[i]t is as if federal officers were installed in state 
legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators 
from voting on any offending proposals.”168  Substitute “at the scene of a 
local police investigation” for “in state legislative chambers,” “police” for 
“legislators,” and “using their state-authorized law enforcement discretion” 
for “voting on any offending proposals,” and we have described the situation 
required by CCR.  None of these substitutions is constitutionally relevant: 
Printz extends the anti-commandeering doctrine to law enforcement, and it 
does not matter that CCR prohibits certain police activity (namely, detaining 
a person asserting a concealed carry right based on an out-of-state permit) 
rather than compelling it.  Rejecting a similar argument, the Murphy Court 
 166.  Cf. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (“since the Constitution confers upon Congress the power 
to regulate individuals, not States, [a federal law alleged to be merely preemptive rather than 
commandeering] must be best read as one that regulates private actors” in order to be constitutional) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 167.  To be sure, this distinction does not turn on the wording of a given provision.  As the 
Court explained in Murphy, a law could be worded as a prohibition on a state regulating a private 
party but still be best understood as a grant of a federal license to engage in particular action.  See
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (using as an example of this phenomenon a federal law deregulating 
airlines and prohibiting any state from imposing its own regulations on the federally-deregulated 
conduct).  But subsection (c) differs from this template: unlike the airline example Murphy
provided, it does not regulate states in the service of vindicating federal regulation (or de-
regulation) of private persons’ primary conduct.  Instead, it regulates the means by which state law 
enforcement investigate whether in fact the individual in question is exercising the federally-
granted right.  Indeed, that regulation extends far beyond federal insistence that that right exist, to 
intrude into the realm of police investigative procedures—most notably, police decisions whether 
or not to detain a person while determining whether that person is indeed validly exercising that 
federal right. 
 168.  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478. 
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observed that the distinction between prohibiting and compelling state action 
“is empty.”169
Thus, whatever one might say about subsection (a)’s grant of a federal 
right to carry a concealed weapon in any concealed-carry state by producing 
any state’s concealed carry permit, subsection (c)’s directions to local police 
as to how to investigate and enforce this provision violates the anti-
commandeering doctrine.  To be sure, the CCR situation is not on all fours 
with the situation in Printz.  In Printz it was both theoretically possible and 
practically workable for federal officials to be tasked with performing the 
background checks the Brady Act required.170  By contrast, the typical law 
enforcement situation CCR presents involves a local police officer 
encountering a person concealing a weapon.  Given that situation, it is 
implausible that the local officer could immediately summon a federal 
official who would then take charge of the concealed carry investigation.171
One might think that this reality requires the conclusion that subsection 
(c) does not commandeer state law enforcement.  This argument insists that 
it would be constitutionally unacceptable for the federal government to find 
itself unable fully to vindicate the concealed carry right that we are 
presuming it has the constitutional authority to confer.172  Thus, one might 
conclude, the federal government’s presumed power to confer that right must 
mean that subsection (c)’s measures for vindicating it simply cannot violate 
the anti-commandeering principle. 
But that conclusion would be incorrect.  First, as noted earlier,173 even 
laws that unquestionably constitute federal regulation of interstate commerce 
are subject to the anti-commandeering limitation.  None of the anti-
commandeering cases suggests that the prohibition on commandeering must 
give way when that prohibition prevents a federal right from being fully 
vindicated.  Second, and more generally, it is simply wrong to say that 
Congress must have the power to fully vindicate any right that it has the 
power to confer.  Indeed, the very federalism concerns that animate the 
commandeering prohibition create exactly such results in other doctrinal 
areas.  For example, Eleventh Amendment immunity often prevents a federal 
 169.  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.  
 170.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that the result of the Court’s holding was that the federal government would be 
incentivized to send federal law enforcement officials into the states to perform the required 
background checks). 
 171.  Indeed, such a dynamic would presumably entail the detention of the individual until the 
federal officer arrived, contradicting subsection (c). 
 172.  But see supra Part II (raising questions about that authority). 
 173.  See supra text accompanying note 134. 
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right-holder from suing a state that is violating that right, and thus prevents 
her from vindicating it.174
This argument also ignores the crucial question of the constitutional 
power Congress would be relying on when enacting CCR legislation.  As 
explained immediately above, relying on the commerce power to create the 
reciprocal concealed carry right carries with it the anti-commandeering 
limitation on that power, even if that limitation means that the right cannot 
be fully vindicated.  But other congressional powers may not be subject to 
the anti-commandeering limitation.  Most notably, there is a real question 
whether laws based on Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power are subject to the anti-commandeering restriction.  After all, as the 
Court has noted in a different context,175 the Fourteenth Amendment is a 
direct restriction on state power, and differs from the Commerce Clause on 
that basis.  The distinctive character of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a set of explicit “thou shalt nots” directed to states makes it 
at least plausible, if not outright logical, that the anti-commandeering 
prohibition does not apply to congressional attempts to enforce those 
restrictions on state conduct. 
Thus, there might be a way for Congress to accomplish the apparent 
commandeering that subsection (c) seeks to accomplish.  But that would 
require Congress to ground a CCR statute in its power to enforce either the 
Second Amendment, the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the bill’s limits 
on police’s power to detain persons suspected of a concealed weapons 
violation), or perhaps the Due Process Clause more generally (as applied to 
the bill’s insistence that a particular quantum of evidence is sufficient to 
make out a prima facie showing of lawful concealed carry).176  While this 
Article has bracketed a full discussion of congressional power to enact CCR 
 174.  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (concluding that the 
Interstate Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity to 
claims seeking retrospective relief such as damages for violations of a congressionally-granted right 
enacted on the authority of that clause).  Of course, such a plaintiff could attempt to get around the 
Eleventh Amendment’s immunity grant, but such attempts are by no means automatically or nearly-
automatically successful—and, importantly, such attempts do not gain force merely because they 
reflect fallback attempts to vindicate a federal right once a first remedy is deemed unavailable.  See 
id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that its lawsuit against the state was allowable under Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), after holding that its statutory claim was unavailable). 
 175.  See Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 65–66 (1996). 
 176.  The evidentiary provision could also be supportable under the power Article IV’s full 
faith and credit guarantee gives to Congress.  But see supra Part II (C) (analyzing that power 
generally and in particular as applied to the evidentiary provision); see also supra note 152 
(considering whether an Effects Clause grounded statute might also be subject to the anti-
commandeering limitation). 
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legislation under its enforcement power,177 very serious questions cloud any 
such claim, either with regard to the CCR right generally or subsection (c) 
of the bill in particular.178  While that question requires fuller study and 
analysis, it should be understood that, with one possible exception,179 only 
the enforcement power could even potentially justify subsection (c). 
5.  Policy Arguments 
Beyond doctrinal details, the broader policies underlying the anti-
commandeering rule also suggest the problematic nature of the CCR bill.  
Most notably, the anti-commandeering doctrine serves, among other 
purposes, to ensure that the public remains able to assign blame (or praise) 
for particular regulatory initiatives to the proper level of government.180
Thus, for example, by mandating that states develop a policy addressing the 
safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste, the federal statute struck down 
in New York blurred the lines of governmental accountability by imposing 
on state governments a federal mandate to prioritize that policy issue over 
others.  Similarly, the Brady Act’s background check provision required 
local law enforcement officers to spend time satisfying that federal mandate, 
thus blurring accountability when the CLEO necessarily deprioritized other 
law enforcement needs. 
One can easily envision a scenario in which a local police officer’s 
decision not to arrest or even detain someone found to be concealing a 
weapon would raise the public’s concern about how that officer was using 
her discretion.  That type of situation seems exactly the one the Court worried 
about in New York and Printz, with the public objecting to how local officers 
were using their discretion and the officers in turn pointing to the federal 
mandate and attempting to explain that they had no choice.  For example, 
 177.  But see supra Part II (B). 
 178.  See supra note 73 (citing scholars remarking on the strictness of the Court’s scrutiny of 
federal legislation grounded on the Enforcement Clause).  
 179.  Article IV authorizes congressional action to “prescribe the Manner” by which the actions 
subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause “shall be proved,” “and the Effect thereof.”  U.S. CONST.
art. IV § 1.  At most, this power might allow Congress to prescribe a rule regarding how the 
existence of an out-of-state concealed carry license may be proven.  This power might thus allow 
Congress to prescribe subsection (c)’s prima facie evidence provision.  However, such an argument 
assumes what is by no means proven—that a concealed carry permit is in fact subject to the full 
faith and credit guarantee, and that Congress’s Article IV power extends into the context of on-the-
ground state law enforcement conduct.  See supra Part II (C) (discussing this question briefly).  
This power would presumably not authorize subsection (c)’s rule governing police officers’ 
discretion to detain persons who produce an out-of-state permit supporting their concealed carry.  
And again, any such Effects Clause argument would encounter the possibility that laws enacted 
pursuant to that authority are subject to the anti-commandeering limitation.  See supra note 152. 
 180.  E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930  (1997) (explaining the anti-
commandeering idea in these terms). 
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imagine a federal mandate that, upon discovery of an immigrant’s unlawful 
residency status, local officers had to detain the immigrant.  One can easily 
imagine local citizens objecting to that use of the officer’s discretion, and 
finding themselves frustrated when the officer explained that she was simply 
complying with a federal mandate. 
The hard question here is whether the CCR bill’s provision of rules 
governing arrest and detention of individuals possessing concealed weapons, 
and its provision of a rule of evidence for determining the legality of any 
instance of concealed possession, are best understood as elements of the 
concealed possession right the federal government presumably181 has the 
authority to confer, or a regulation of how state law enforcement exercises 
its discretion.  This Article has already discussed this issue in the context of 
discussing the details of anti-commandeering doctrine.182  But, appropriately 
enough, the same issue arises when one considers that doctrine’s underlying 
justification.  In considering this final question, it may simply be that both
legislation that unconstitutionally commandeers and legislation that simply 
preempts state law to grant a federal right implicate accountability concerns.  
For example, one can envision angry New Yorkers asking their port 
commissioner why Aaron Ogden’s monopoly is not being enforced, or angry 
New Yorkers asking an NYPD officer why their concealed carry law is not 
being enforced, and feeling unsatisfied when the commissioner or the officer 
points to Thomas Gibbons’ or the out-of-state gun carrier’s federal (or 
federally-endorsed) license and explaining that he had no choice but to honor 
it.
This uncomfortable reality—that accountability is blurred regardless of 
how we conceptualize the federal law in question—perhaps means, 
ironically, that a more formalist conception of the commandeering concept 
is the best approach.  If so, then at least subsection (c)’s provisions appear 
vulnerable to the anti-commandeering claim. 
B.  The Non-Delegation Defense 
A final argument for questioning the constitutionality of the federal 
reciprocal concealed carry bill is both the least plausible-sounding but 
potentially the most meritorious.  It may be that such a law would (or should) 
be struck down as violating the non-delegation doctrine. 
The most obvious objection to this suggestion is the well-known 
characterization of the non-delegation doctrine as a moribund relic of the 
pre-1937 Court.  But that characterization oversimplifies a more nuanced 
 181.  See supra Part II (considering Congress’s authority to enact CCR legislation). 
 182.  See text accompanying supra notes 164-171. 
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reality.183  Beyond the equally well-known fact that the Court has never 
formally repudiated the doctrine, in recent decades the Court has employed 
the threat of a non-delegation strike-down as justification for giving 
narrowing interpretations to otherwise broad-sounding statutes.184  More 
recently, the Court’s cert. grant on the non-delegation issue in United States 
v. Gundy185 makes it clear that interest exists at the Court in examining at 
least the potential for a renewed focus on the non-delegation principle.  
Unless the Court completely dismisses the non-delegation argument in 
Gundy as frivolous, any decision it renders—even one upholding the 
statute—will presumably warrant lower courts giving this argument more 
than cursory attention when litigants raise it. 
The CCR bill, if it ever became law, would likely be a good candidate 
for any such revitalized non-delegation scrutiny.  Two features of such a law 
work together to make this the case.  First, such a law would delegate power 
to states, rather than to an instrumentality of the federal government (such as 
an executive branch or independent administrative agency).  Second, that 
delegation would lack even the hint of a standard.  This sub-Part considers 
these issues in that order. 
1.  Delegation to a State 
The first unusual feature of the CCR bill is that it would delegate power 
to a state, by prescribing that state-determined standards all-but fully 
govern186 when a person could obtain a concealed carry permit that then, by 
operation of that statute, would be valid in any state that allows any form of 
concealed carry. 
a.  Federal Incorporation of State Law 
To be sure, the mere incorporation of state law into federal law—and 
thus, the implied delegation to state lawmakers—has long been held to not 
raise a serious non-delegation problem.  A well-known example of such 
 183.  See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (“Reports 
of the death of the nondelegation doctrine have been greatly exaggerated.”). 
 184.  See, e.g., Indust. Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 
(1980) (plurality opinion) (adopting limited interpretation of a federal workplace safety law in order 
to avoid serious non-delegation problem); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 
(2001) (doing the same to a federal environmental law); cf. National Cable TV Ass’n v. United 
States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (construing a congressional authorization to an agency to collect a fee 
as not authorizing it to levy a tax, given the non-delegation problems that would arise in that latter 
case). See also Sunstein, supra note 183. 
 185.  United States v. Gundy, 695 Fed. Appx. 639 (2017).  
 186.  To be sure, the bill limits the reciprocal effect of state-issued concealed carry permits to 
persons “not prohibited by federal law from . . . possessing a firearm.”  H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 
101(a) (2017).   
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incorporation is the series of assimilative crimes laws Congress has enacted 
since the early 19th century.  These federal laws make applicable in federal 
enclaves such as military bases and national parks the criminal laws of the 
state in which the given enclave is located.   In 1910, the Court in easily and 
quickly rejected a non-delegation attack on such laws.187  However, until the 
mid-20th century such laws were static, in the sense that they adopted as 
federal law whatever state law was at that point extant.  Thus, these versions 
of the assimilative crimes laws simply accomplished incorporation by 
reference, as if Congress had merely copied verbatim the criminal codes of 
the states as they existed at that moment and made them federal law in the 
relevant enclaves. 
As one can imagine, crafting these assimilative crimes laws in this static 
way was not ideal, as the federal law of an enclave would slowly become 
inconsistent with that of the surrounding state as that state gradually altered 
its laws.  Thus, in 1948, Congress enacted a dynamic assimilative crimes 
law, one that made the law of the surrounding state applicable in the relevant 
enclave, but also continued to update that federal law as the law of the 
surrounding state changed.  A concealed carry reciprocity law would be more 
analogous to this latter version of the assimilative crime statute, since it 
would adopt as federal law a rule based on state concealed carry laws as 
those state laws evolved.  One can understand why such a law would pose a 
more serious non-delegation challenge than its static incorporation 
predecessors, since it would be impossible for a court to uphold it on the 
theory that Congress had essentially simply copied into the U.S. Code the 
actual state laws that it wished to incorporate. 
Despite this more troubling feature, in United States v. Sharpnack188 the 
Court rejected a non-delegation challenge to the dynamic assimilative crimes 
law.  Interestingly—especially for the standard story about the non-
delegation doctrine becoming moribund after 1935—two justices would 
have held the federal law invalid on non-delegation grounds.189  The 
majority, speaking through Justice Burton, explained that, despite its 
dynamic incorporation of state law, the federal statute nevertheless reflected 
a congressional policy—namely, that federal enclaves be governed by the 
same criminal law as the surrounding states, except as that state law might 
be superseded by particular federal criminal prohibitions.  In his opinion, 
Justice Burton relied heavily on the history of such assimilative crimes laws, 
which he said reflected a consistent congressional policy to that effect, and 
 187.  Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559, 569 (1910). 
 188.  355 U.S. 286 (1958). 
 189.  See id. at 297 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J.). 
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concluded that the dynamic statute challenged in Sharpnack merely carried 
forth that policy more efficiently. 
A moment’s reflection makes clear that many federal laws incorporate 
state law, and, indeed, do so dynamically.  As examples, Social Security law 
uses state law definitions of marriage and the Federal Tort Claims Act 
subjects the United States to legal liability based on the tort law of the state 
in which the tort occurred.190  Such laws have not triggered serious non-
delegation challenges.  Perhaps most ironically, one of the 1935 non-
delegation cases, Panama Refining v. Ryan,191 authorized the President to 
prohibit the interstate shipment of oil that was extracted or removed from 
storage in excess of state law quotas.  While Panama Refining struck down 
that authority as a violation of the non-delegation doctrine, the reason was 
not the state law-foundation for the conduct Congress authorized the 
President to take.192
Nevertheless, important differences would distinguish a CCR law from 
these latter examples, and even from the dynamic assimilative crimes statute.  
Most significantly, these other laws’ incorporation of state law all relate in 
some way to the state whose law is being incorporated.  Crimes on a federal 
enclave in South Dakota are governed by South Dakota law, a tort committed 
by a federal entity in Texas is governed by Texas law, and a retired couple 
in Connecticut are married for Social Security purposes if Connecticut 
recognizes their marriage.  By contrast, the federal reciprocal concealed 
carry law adopts state laws for the purpose of making those laws applicable 
nationwide.
b.  Incorporation or Delegation? 
This nationwide effect might be an odd feature of a CCR law, but why 
should it matter for non-delegation purposes?  It matters because Congress 
is the national law-maker.  These other instances of federal incorporation of 
state law do not authorize any state to make law with nationwide effect.  
Under the assimilative crimes act, a crime on a federal enclave in South 
Dakota may be governed by South Dakota, but a crime on a federal enclave 
in North Dakota is not.  Similarly, if Connecticut recognizes marriages 
between first cousins, then such a pairing living in Hartford would be eligible 
for Social Security survivor benefits, but if Massachusetts does not recognize 
 190.  Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 295; see also id. at 297 (more examples extant as of 1958). 
 191.  293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 192.  See id. at 414–30. 
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such marriages, then an analogous pairing in Boston would not.193  By 
contrast, under a CCR law, a holder of a concealed carry permit issued by 
Vermont may take that permit into New York and insist that New York 
recognize it.  National law is thus made by one state. 
In turn, this feature of a CCR law matters for a reason that goes to both 
the theoretical foundation of the non-delegation principle, and the 
relationship between federal and state power.  Federalizing any rule that a 
state may wish to make, with no federally-imposed substantive standards 
guiding that rule, allows one state to make rules applicable beyond its 
borders.  This violates the constitutional principle implicit in the non-
delegation doctrine—and, indeed, more generally in the republican character 
of the federal government—that federal law must be made through a process 
that features representation of all of the people. 
Delegations to states to make policy binding on other states violate that 
principle.  This is not an indictment of the motives of state lawmakers.  Both 
in the gun context and beyond, local or regional needs may vary greatly,194
and lawmakers crafting legislation, such as a concealed carry regime, are 
presumably responding to the unique needs of their own constituents.  
Almost by definition, authorizing the most permissive state to foist its rules 
onto every other state thus constitutes national-level lawmaking that does not 
take the full national polity’s interests into account, either as a matter of 
process or likely ultimate result.195
c.  The Private Delegation Analogy 
Supreme Court delegation doctrine acknowledges this concern.  In 
Carter v. Carter Coal,196 the Court struck down, partly197 on non-delegation 
grounds, the part of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 that 
authorized producers of two-thirds of the coal in a given district to set the 
minimum wage for coal miners for all mines in that district.  Writing for five 
justices, Justice Sutherland condemned this provision as “delegation in its 
most obnoxious form,” because “it [was] not even delegation to an official 
 193.  See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852) (upholding a federal law that 
incorporated dynamic state-law standards regarding navigation pilotage, but only as those standards 
applied to the ports of the particular state imposing those standards). 
 194.  See generally Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013). 
 195.  See Norman Williams, Why Congress May Not ‘Overrule’ the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153 (2005) (concluding that delegations of interstate commerce 
regulatory power to states is closer to historically disfavored attempts to delegate such power to 
private parties than it is to the assertion of such power by Congress itself). 
 196.  298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 197.  The Court also held that the law exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  
See id. at 297–310. 
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or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose 
interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same 
business.”198
To be sure, it is easy to dismiss the modern relevance of Carter Coal,
given its status as a final expression of the pre-1937 Court’s hostility to 
federal regulation of the economy.199  Still, Chief Justice Hughes, who wrote 
the opinion that signaled the switch to a broader federal commerce power,200
wrote a concurrence in Carter Coal that agreed with the majority’s non-
delegation analysis,201 while Justice Cardozo, joined by Justices Brandeis 
and Stone, declined to reach the non-delegation question.202  Moreover, when 
Congress legislated in analogous areas immediately after Carter Coal,
including a second attempt at regulating coal mining itself, it crafted 
regulatory regimes that were careful to place ultimate regulatory power with 
the relevant federal agency, even if producers and other market participants 
retained a role in the process.203  When the Court upheld these provisions, it 
 198.  Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.  Chief Justice Hughes concurred with this part of the result, 
id. at 317, 318 (separate opinion of Hughes, C.J.).  Justice Cardozo, joined by Justices Brandeis 
and Stone, did not reach this issue, as he considered the challenge to this provision to be premature.  
Id. at 324 (Cardozo, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
Justice Sutherland’s criticism of such private delegations reveals what one might understand as the 
mirror image of the concern, expressed in the text, see text accompanying supra notes 193-195, 
about national law being made by national authorities.  Justice Sutherland contrasted the private 
lawmaking he condemned in Carter Coal to law made “by an official or an official body, 
presumptively disinterested.”  Id.  In doing so, he condemned that provision in the coal statute as a 
violation of due process.  See 298 U.S. at 311.  His citation of due process is striking, until one 
remembers the anti-class legislation tradition that animated much of the pre-1937 Court’s thinking.  
See generally Melissa Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997) (discussing class legislation); WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A BRIEF
INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 11–28 (2017) (same).  A classic definition of class legislation 
was legislation that aimed not at furthering the public interest, but benefitting one private group.  
See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 32 (1884) (“Special burdens are often necessary for 
general benefits . . . .  Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is 
prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if 
within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not [prohibited by 
the Fourteenth Amendment].”).  One can easily understand how a grant of power to a private 
individual, “presumptively []interested,” would run afoul of the class legislation principle and thus 
of the Due Process Clause.  Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311 (noting how some coal producers might 
favor the contents of the coal code promulgated by a discrete set of private coal interests, while 
others might not).   
 199.  See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941) (recognizing that Carter 
Coal’s Commerce Clause analysis had been limited by intervening cases). 
 200.  National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 201.  See supra text accompanying note 198. 
 202.  See id.
 203.  See United States v. Rock-Royal Cooperative, 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939) (explaining the 
analogous provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937); see Sunshine Anthracite Coal 
Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 340, 397–99 (1940) (explaining the analogous provisions of the 
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was careful to distinguish the delegation to private parties that was struck 
down in Carter Coal, rather than simply overruling that earlier case.204
Congress’s reaction to Carter Coal, and the Court’s approving reply, at least 
suggests a constitutional settlement disfavoring, if not out-and-out 
prohibiting, delegations of federal regulatory power to private persons.205
d.  The Analogy Between Private and State Delegations 
Of course, Carter Coal and its progeny, whatever we may make of them 
today, involved delegations of federal power to private persons.  CCR 
legislation involves a delegation of federal power to states.  Nevertheless, 
these judicial condemnations of private delegations reflect the same concerns 
that arise with delegations of nationally-scoped federal power to states.206  In 
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937); id. at 387 (noting that the 1937 law was enacted in response to the 
Court’s decision in Carter Coal).
 204.  See Sunshine Anthracite, 310 U.S. at 399 (rejecting a non-delegation challenge to the 
analogous provisions of the 1937 coal statute by citing Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15–6 (1939), 
which itself had upheld analogous provisions in a tobacco marketing statute by concluding that 
those provisions vested regulatory power with the federal agency even if marketers played a role 
in the regulatory approval process, and which also distinguished Carter Coal on this ground); see 
Rock-Royal, 307 U.S. at 507–08 (similarly relying on Currin to reject a non-delegation challenge 
to an analogous provision in an agricultural marketing statute).  
 205.  See, e.g., Sunstein, “Nondelegation Canons,” supra note 183.  It must be conceded that 
the Court took that same tack with regard to Carter Coal’s Commerce Clause analysis (that is, 
distinguishing it rather than overruling it), even if by then the Court had clearly moved on to a 
different conception of the commerce power.  See Darby, 312 U.S. at 123 (“So far as Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co. is inconsistent with this conclusion, its doctrine is limited in principle by the 
decisions under the Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act, which we have cited and 
which we follow.”) (citation omitted).  Nevertheless, Carter Coal’s non-delegation principle has 
survived in a way that its commerce power analysis has not.  See, e.g., Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos 
Pipeline L.L.C., 872 F.3d 701, 707 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Although th[e] so-called ‘private 
nondelegation’ doctrine has been largely dormant in the years since [the early decades of the 
Twentieth century], its continuing force is generally accepted.”); see also Department of Transp. v. 
Association of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234, 1238 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“By 
any measure, handing off regulatory power to a private entity is ‘legislative delegation in its most 
obnoxious form.’”) (quoting Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311). 
 206.  Certainly, it is true that many cooperative federalism programs, for example, involving 
environmental law, authorize a state role in the federal regulatory process.  See New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (explaining the concept of cooperative federalism).  These 
authorizations may not constitute “delegations” in the strict sense.  See, e.g., Williams, supra note 
195, at 221 (“Congress’s pursuit of a cooperative, regulatory federalism may not involve the 
delegation of federal authority at all but simply the enlistment of the states’ voluntary use of their 
own residual state authority in aid of federal regulatory goals.”)  
Congress routinely enlists states, tribes, and even private individuals in 
implementing federal regulatory programs, thereby suggesting that the modern 
constitutional order permits the sharing of federal legislative authority.  One must 
be careful, however, before drawing too definitive or categorical a conclusion.  The 
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both cases, power and control are divorced—power is granted to regulate 
persons who in turn exercise no control over their regulators.207  In such 
cases, the regulators are unaccountable to the persons they regulate.208
This principle of accountability underlies the non-delegation 
doctrine.209  But it applies more generally throughout American 
constitutional law.  It underlies a variety of canonical federalism concepts, 
indeed, including the anti-commandeering doctrine.210  Even more relevantly 
for our current purposes, it underlies foundational doctrine in areas as 
disparate as inter-governmental tax immunity211 and the dormant Commerce 
Clause,212 both of which deal with the problem posed by CCR legislation—
that is, the problem of one state attempting to foist its regulatory choices onto 
the rest of the nation.  However one views the problem—as one of 
congressional evasion of accountability when it enacts overly-broad 
Court’s use of delegation-sounding terminology may be thoughtless and therefore 
misleading.
Id. at 220–21. 
But even if one considers such cooperative federalism programs a species of federal delegation to 
states, the delegation remains geographically limited, given that under these programs the state 
gains authority to regulate its own citizens within its own territory. 
 207.  Cf. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.C.D.C. 1971) 
(“Concepts of control and accountability define the constitutional [non-delegation] requirement.”). 
 208.  Whether this analogy carries so far as to condemn delegation of nationally-scoped federal 
regulatory power to states as a violation of due process, see Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311, or whether 
the violation remains “simply” one of the non-delegation principle itself, is an interesting question 
that this Article brackets. 
 209.  See supra text accompanying note 207. 
 210.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“Accountability is . . . 
diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with 
the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”). 
 211.  See McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (expressing concern about recognizing 
a state’s power to tax, and thus at least theoretically to destroy, a federal instrumentality which is 
the product of the entire nation’s regulatory choice); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-30 at 512 (2d ed. 1988) (“Operation of a federal instrumentality 
necessarily affects the interests of all since it is for the benefit of all; the national power must 
therefore remain unfettered if control and representation are to be coincident.”) (citing, inter alia,
McColloch, 17 U.S. at 435–36). 
 212.  See South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 
(1938) (singling out for special concern state regulations affecting interstate commerce “whose 
purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, 
or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within” on the 
theory that “that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon 
those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints 
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the 
state”).  Indeed, after this quote, the Court cited the page from Cooley in which the Court expressed 
confidence that local pilotage requirements, since they impose burdens on merchants using that 
port, can be expected to be kept to the minimum necessary to satisfy the legitimate needs underlying 
such requirements.  See id. (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 315 (1851)). 
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statutes,213  federal evasion of accountability when it imposes regulatory 
burdens on state governments,214 state evasion of accountability when it 
burdens federal instrumentalities215 or interstate commerce,216 or arbitrary 
(that is, non-public regarding) action more generally217—there emerges the 
unifying theme of the problem caused by an asymmetrical relationship 
between power over persons and those persons’ control over those who wield 
that power. 
None of this analysis casts doubt on a truly national decision-making 
process yielding a decision to adopt and thus effectively nationalize one 
state’s rule.  Thus, for example, Congress could adopt, copy or even 
incorporate by reference the standards under Vermont law for a concealed 
carry permit, and make those standards federal law, applicable nationwide.  
But CCR legislation does not do this.  Instead, it adopts the standards of an 
individual state and makes them applicable nationwide.  When it does that it 
turns over the power to bind all of the American people to the people of one 
given state.218
As noted earlier, some federal laws, such as the modern Assimilative 
Crimes Act, do bind federal law to the ongoing policy and legal decisions 
made by the people of one state.  But such laws do so in a much more 
geographically limited way, in a context in which Congress may well have a 
legitimate interest in incorporating that state’s law—for example, by 
applying that state’s law to apply on federal enclaves within that state or 
applying that state’s law to tort claims against the federal government arising 
out of alleged torts occurring in that state.  By contrast, abdicating the power 
to make nationwide law—law for all of the American people—to any one 
state violates the very idea of a national legislature that draws its authority 
from all the American people and that alone has the authority to legislate in 
the name of the American people.  If “concepts of control and 
accountability” underlie the non-delegation doctrine,219 then such control, 
and surely such accountability, is just as decisively lost when Congress 
delegates power to a state to legislate for the nation as it is when Congress 
delegates lawmaking authority to a private party. 
 213.  See infra text accompanying notes 220-221. 
 214.  See supra text accompanying note 210. 
 215.  See supra text accompanying note 211. 
 216.  See supra text accompanying note 212. 
 217.  See supra text accompanying note 198. 
 218.  This problem is not cured by making the standards of each and every individual state 
applicable nationwide, because each state’s standards, as implemented through each state’s 
concealed carry permitting decisions, are created by that state’s polity and only that state’s polity. 
See text accompanying supra notes 206-208. 
 219.  Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971). 
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2.  Reciprocity as the Lack of a Standard 
This conclusion leads to the second, closely-related, reason a CCR law 
should be understood as raising serious non-delegation concerns: the lack of 
standards.  As noted at the end of the previous section, Congress could easily 
and legitimately decide that one particular state’s standard or rule governing 
certain conduct should be nationalized.  Since it could enact that state rule 
by copying the relevant language from the state code, there’s no reason it 
could not incorporate that language by reference.  But in doing so, the federal 
law would be enacting a discernable legal standard.  Even if that standard 
was vague (for example, because the state law being copied was vague), the 
resulting federal law would still be subject only to the deferential scrutiny 
modern non-delegation jurisprudence demands.220
But Congress’s wholesale incorporation of any and all standards 
adopted by states, and its elevation of those state standards to rules of 
nationwide applicability (rather than rules governing the relationship of the 
federal government and federal programs to a given state) is different.  Such 
a congressional decision reflects no choice at all about what substantive 
standards should govern concealed firearms carry nationwide.  Thus, this is 
not a situation where Congress enacts standards, which are then challenged 
as too vague.  That latter situation triggers the well-known critique that 
courts lack the capacity to distinguish between legislative standards that may 
be vague but are sufficiently determinate to state an “intelligible principle” 
and those that are simply too vague to tolerate.  By contrast, CCR legislation 
simply abdicates the task of enacting any standards at all.221  Indeed, one way 
of describing it is as a literal delegation of the lawmaking task, rather than 
the specification of an admittedly-vague standard whose application by an 
entity other than Congress might be considered either (illegitimate) 
lawmaking or (legitimate) administration.222
 220.  Cf. Department of Transp. v. Ass’n. of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1234, 1238 (2015) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (distinguishing congressional delegation of power to a federal 
instrumentality, for which some justification might be sufficient, with delegation of that power to 
a private party, for which “there is not even a fig leaf of constitutional justification”). 
 221.  Id. at 1234, 1238 (Alito, J., concurring) (drawing a similar distinction).  The requirements 
in the CCR bill—that the person hold a valid ID and a valid concealed carry permit (or be eligible 
to do so in the person’s home state), and be qualified under federal law to possess, transport, or 
receive a firearm under federal law, do not change this conclusion, as they still leave to each state 
the discretion to decide who is eligible to possess a permit, with no standards governing those 
choices.  In particular, the requirement that the individual be eligible to possess a firearm under 
federal law is presumably intended simply to protect the integrity of existing federal law—that is, 
to prevent the holder of a concealed permit to use the federal concealed carry right to defeat any 
other federally-imposed restriction on that person’s possession of a firearm. 
 222.  Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that 
the federal law delegating power to the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing 
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Does this analysis mean that Congress is powerless to legislate 
nationwide reciprocity on any topic?  Not necessarily.  As long as a federal 
law provided minimal substantive standards for such reciprocity, then it’s 
possible that such a law would survive non-delegation scrutiny.  In that case, 
those minimal standards would reveal the substantive choices Congress 
made about the relevant regulatory issue.  But “pure” reciprocity does not 
itself reflect a substantive policy.  Such a policy “choice” would be better 
understood as a complete abdication of the obligation to make a choice. 
To illustrate this final point, consider that a federal “policy” of pure 
reciprocity can be analogized to a federal policy that whatever Arizona 
chooses with regard to concealed carry will be national policy.  The only 
difference between this “policy” and the CCR bill is that the latter enshrines 
a policy in which the choices of the 49 other states, rather than just Arizona’s, 
becomes binding on every state.  Just as a federal “policy” to make Arizona’s 
choices national law is no federal policy at all, but an abdication of policy-
making power to the Arizona legislature, so too making the choices of each 
state national policy, each binding on all the others, reflects no meaningful 
federal policy choice.  If abdication to Arizona violates the non-delegation 
principle, then abdication to each of the 50 states does as well—50 times 
over.
Conclusion
Concealed carry reciprocity is a novel concept.  Of course, that novelty 
does not necessarily count against its constitutionality;223 as Chief Justice 
Roberts observed when evaluating the constitutionality of what he viewed as 
the novel regulatory expedient of compelling Americans to participate in 
interstate commerce, “there is a first time for everything.”224  On the other 
hand, in the very next sentence in his opinion he stated, “[b]ut sometimes the 
guidelines was “a pure delegation of legislative power” because that delegated power did not come 
with any authority either to administer the statute or adjudicate claims under it).  To be sure, Justice 
Scalia’s argument in Mistretta is slightly different from the one made here.  Justice Scalia’s 
concern, at least in part, was that the delegation of power to the Commission did not come with any 
accompanying mandate to administer the statute or adjudicate claims under it.  Thus, that delegation 
could not be described as a delegation of quasi-executive or quasi-judicial power—hence, his 
description of the law as a delegation of “pure” legislative power.  Whether the CCR bill’s 
delegation could be similarly described is a complex question, in light of the fact that, on the one 
hand, states would remain responsible for administering their concealed carry regimes but, on the 
other, that administration would remain administration of a state rather than a federal program.  
 223.  But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“if . . . earlier Congresses 
avoided use of this highly attractive power [to conscript state officials to enforce federal law], we 
would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist”). 
 224.  National Fed. of Indep. Businesses v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012). 
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most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of 
historical precedent for Congress’s action.”225
In the case of concealed carry reciprocity, the most that can be said at 
this point is that the constitutional authority for such novel legislation is far 
from settled, despite the obvious candidates this Article has preliminarily 
canvassed.226  Moreover, such legislation raises serious questions about 
whether it transgresses important constitutional limitations.227  This Article’s 
analysis suggests that the ultimate fate of this regulatory experiment is 
already seriously clouded, even before it has been enacted. 
 225.  Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 549 (internal quotation omitted; brackets in original). 
 226.  See supra Part II. 
 227.  See supra Part III. 
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